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KARL JASPERS SOCIETY SESSION, MODERNITY, ETC. by Glenn C. Wood 24 June 2002, posted 2 July 2002, TA40, C9

Thank you for some stimulating "epienlightenment." Having come in from a 30 year field trip I can't express emphatically enough my appreciation for clarifying some confusing use of terms being encountered such as "modern", "post-modern" and the word "modernity" -- the most latter being a word tossed about by an extremely modern liberal (current corrupted use of "liberal" different from the way F.A. Hayek used it in The Road To Serfdom -- about which Milton Friedman in an introduction expressed amazement over its abrupt change in meaning -- equal to my amazement regarding "modern" except I think a conspiracy of sorts is understandable) thinker encountered at a Karl Jaspers Society session at an American Philosophical Association gathering a few years ago. That modern liberality seemed to me to absorb relatively harmless cartesian philosophical thoughts -- harmless if not considered too seriously and not contributing, through loose libertine conduct to pandemic diseases. Perhaps that is what you see in your reference to the Mary Klage's works on the effect of fundamentalism on a process of fragmentation going on which you seem to think is resolvable by "Post-moderns" and "constructionists" getting together for some unifying purpose. I've a feeling though that these liberals and undercover conceptionists are behind the fragmentations. I've been unable to access the Klages site, but look foreword to taking a look see.

A one-world unity already exists, at least there is a one-world order in an economical sense which is pretty real for those profiting by it but still ... independent ... of beautiful minds wasted outside the borders of benefits (see One World Ready or Not by William Greider). But this might be what you are referring to regarding "fragmentation." I, as a sabbatical-like student here, would of course appreciate your special attention regarding that word.

It discombobulates my occasional congealing hope for genuine communication to have you say that my "objective reality is all we have" is a MIR-statement and can only be defended by a working fiction. There would ... between ... us be no communication without a working fiction and it seems to me that for one to interpret otherwise -- my mind's objectifications for communicative purposes -- is searching for MIR indicators in the hopes of finding some to preserve an anti-MIR formula as a personal original idea. My statement should be given the benefit of trust and interpretations ought to start with my testimony that without the mind, reality is not possible as a percept and concept. Not wanting to yield to hypnotic control or presumptions in major premises I'll reserve the freedom to use the word "reality" until the cows come up for milking and I have to return to the barnyard.

Though it's my vivid imagination, it seems that if one says "Ah ha! Mind-independent-reality" often enough all are expected to be fooled part of the time at least. (The words "Christian Scientist" keeps popping up in my thoughts as one way to classify such judgments, but I've kept "Ah ha" repressed.)

I really do get the impression though that if I used titles of distinction a greater intellectual fairness would be forthcoming from you. But you can be assured no disrespect is meant except maybe a certain ignoring if one thinks another should condescend to titles. If it could be confirmed that this is not a reality, but my imagination, than I would be happy to admit being guilty of a momentary lapse into a mind-independent reality, and this bit of fictional use of objectivity for communicative purposes would have been affective. That momentary lapse though is a responding to what appears imaginings about “MIR” statements -- a clear “MIR” or apperception, or as concept of an apparition -- maybe.

(I'm reminded again of something Karl Jaspers wrote regarding the easy loss of sanity when dealing with such questions as these, and humor seems to work as a balancing bar on this tight-rope walk. It's impressive and ironic too to read the candor with which some KJF contributors talk about their schizophrenia. It's almost humorous that the KJF actually offers an intensity of thought contributing to remission, and Mr. Muller should be thanked for that -- as one who probably knows or will come to know what he's doing.)

Responses have already been routed to the Forum relative to Plato etc. in the response to Mr. Moore's C1TA51 posting.

Let me conclude by reassuring you that I am thoroughly enjoying these dialogues and that nothing should be considered rancorous in my more confrontational than condescending statements -- designed to zero in on clarity without losing sight of learned ignorance.


Postscript to that American Philosophical/KJS meeting: More has occurred to me belatedly what that liberal fellow was attempting to do with regard to talk about "modernity." It was an attempt to not only show Karl Jaspers to be ... derived ... from the so called modern era like from Descartes through Kant regarding any enlightenment one might get from Jaspers' vast experience; more than this it was an attempt to get Jaspers out of the post-modern constructionist zero-derivation era because he can't be dealt with face to face.

Fortunately there were a couple Karl Jaspers experts there -- one an author of books about Karl Jaspers -- that were not going to let that happen. One asked a question the answer to which showed Jaspers was not dependent on Descartes, and the author made it clear Jaspers was not to be confined to "modernity" or an era of a Church-liturgical-revelation-continuum [my words] such as that to which Descartes belonged. Without admitting there's been a change in the proper definition of "modern" it must be understood that Karl Jaspers is as relevant now and a real enlightening threat to so called Post-moderns and liberal constructionism no less. Furthermore, when I use the word modern I expect it to be taken in the ... normal ... sense when used outside the forcefully “evolved” corrupted Post-modern frame of reference.

This word "modern" and "liberal" has gone through an acute and bruising unnatural metamorphosis and the constructionistic movements are more like death rattles, temper or death throws, or like a killdeer's cry and fluttering to distract from a nest, in this case the discovery of the conspired changes. It seems equivalent to the loss of meaning to such words synonymous with "carefree" and "happy."

When I announced that I was there to see what the Heideggerians are doing with Jaspers, the nuance was resounding.


NO BASIS IN JASPERS FOR REALITY DEPENDENT ON “MIND” by Glenn C. Wood 16 September 2002, posted 24 September 2002, TA44, C6

<1> In Mr. Dongier's R2 to Mr. Buchanan's C5 he speaks about jumping from the subjective private nature of individual experience to the denial of an independent collectively constructed body of knowledge, namely mind-independent reality. Mr. Buchanan then replies that his position does not involve the "denial of a mind-independent reality." He states it is an inaccurate inference and a misinterpretation of his position and parenthetically adds that he would be interested in any basis that seems to compel any such inference.

<2> It seems a few references can be pointed to. One such reference can be found in TA44C4<10> where there seems little doubt about the emphasis, for every letter is emphasized: "THE MIND DOES NOT COME FROM THE BRAIN, THE BRAIN COMES FROM THE MIND". Another reference is seen in <7>: "(Belief in 'values' which are no more than forms of words i.e., lacking in operational criteria, will be seen from a systems perspective as useless or misleading)." That appears on the surface to be an arbitrary belief in itself.

<3> It's obvious to me there's correspondence between Buchanan and Muller. Perhaps the clearest quote is in <3>: "with respect to basic premises I take a view similar to that of Herbert Muller, grounded in the philosophy of Karl Jaspers as well as systems science set in the context of the 'encompassing' of existence, i.e. with real feedback." Feedback: What is most clear about this is the dropping of the names as though that ... value ... in itself is objectively independent of mind enough to endear to something assumed. There's an assumption here that these two gentlemen are grounded in the philosophy of Karl Jaspers. I think Mr. Buchanan assumed as much initially. I've yet to see where an authentic connection has been made with the thoughts of Karl Jaspers. In 3. Mr. Buchanan suggests we need a trans-disciplinary approach and states it has not yet fully been exploited. Seems to me clearly an interdisciplinary approach is needed with less exploitation as method and technique.

<4> Other quotes suggest a wavering however but no change in standing by association with Muller and Jaspers: "There are now few people who doubt that mental life requires and depends on brain" and now, rather, there's some reservations; now there's "a sense that I understand Muller's view that 'the brain comes from the mind', although obviously the relations are reciprocal and integral." References to Jaspers' General Psychopathology are seemingly exploitative which of course does not depend on an interpretation and understanding of Jaspers in general, for one cannot show that Jaspers holds to "the mind does not come from the brain, the brain comes the mind."

<5> The statement by Mr. Dongier seems appropriate enough; that the brain comes from the mind is an "... article of faith." It's a shame Mr. Dongier's typing doesn't lend itself to addressing this matter further. There's little doubt about the value of faith, but there also seems to be an effort to exploit that and to substitute another faith for independently collected bodies of knowledge. That seems to me one consequence of the "paradigm shift" Mr. Buchanan wants recognition for.

<6> Mr. Buchanan states that he does not think belief systems based upon incompatible ideologies can coexist peacefully in the real world. That on the surface appears less than a revelation, but then again it appears like dogmatics to me and arbitrary judgmental thinking. He states that Jaspers thinks arbitrary beliefs create real problems. That is true especially if one is thinking about the arbitrary beliefs in the ideologies of pseudo-scientific thinking, the kind that can be interpreted as being exhibited in Mr. Buchanan's presentations.

<7> In all fairness to Jaspers, if he is claimed as support, it would be well to give proper quotes and references rather than groundlessly saying "Jaspers thought so." In these mind-body thoughts, it is well not to forget the ease in which one can lose balance, for Jaspers says, "to live in the transparency of empirical reality easily makes possible slipping into groundlessness." (Truth and Symbol from Von Der Wahrheit, Consciousness of Being in the Cypher, p.45 College and University Press, 1959.) Thus the need for values and bodies of knowledge can be -- in a balanced perspective -- seen and even felt as necessarily independent of some urges of brains and wonderings of minds.


Peter Mutnick and Glenn C Wood 8 March 2002, posted 19 March 2002, TA45, C33

<1> [Herbert Müller (seminar announcement, 19 March 2002) : ]
How the mind emerges from the brain cannot be answered because it is the wrong question. It pre-supposes mind-independent reality (static ontology) which excludes the mind. The situation improves with working ontology, where reality results from mind-nature structure positing and investment of belief (knowledge). "The brain" then means individual and collective knowledge of brain structure and function, within subject-inclusive experience (mind).

<2> [Peter Mutnick]
Müller continues to miss the point, IMHO. Without positing something that you sincerely believe to be real, everything (for you), and all of your discourse, continues to be insincere and unreal. It is a difficult bind, and one that can only be solved by making the leap of faith into the hands of the living God and letting Him reveal to you what *is* real (Israel, the spiritual one, not the political one).

<3> Sorry, I forgot to clearly distinguish my position from Müller's "working ontology". If it is just a matter of guesswork and "investment", then indeed you have the capitalist mentality that IMHO has done so much damage to both the psyche and the body of Humanity. It is indeed all guesses and investments that one must *continue* to doubt. Müller's claim to a radical phenomenology is therefore false, and his is far inferior to the phenomenology of Descartes, much less that of Husserl, which are both based on positive results obtained as the result of a complete suspension of the faculties of guesswork and "investment".

<4> Husserl emphasized eidetic thinking that results from the *epoche*, where one receives clear and vivid imagery that has the unmistakable mark of absolute reality. It is the kind of conviction that Einstein had when he said just before the test of his theory during the eclipse, "If it is not proven, I pity the Good Lord, for the theory is correct." And of course it was. However, the problems we are now addressing, even Einstein could not fully penetrate, but someday someone will, and with the same absolute conviction.

<5> Müller's methodology is essentially correct, but the problem is that it is not anchored in *any* kind of reality. If an individual held that philosophy in reference to himself, he would be termed a megalomaniac, and it really does not lessen the impact to try to invoke a collective identity or group identity. It is still just as offensive and just as insane.

<6> I truly believe that the only leg we have to stand on is an omniscient God (or Buddha) who does know what is ultimately real and can convey it to us because we are parts and parcels of that omniscient God (or Buddha). That is what real phenomenology is based on, no matter whether you talk about God explicitly, as did Descartes, or whether you talk about the transcendental ego and pure unconditioned consciousness, as did Husserl.


<7> [Müller :]
PM tells us that he needs absolute outside truth as a "leg to stand on", which is fine and actually a wide-spread notion, but it does not necessarily apply to everybody (and perhaps one should rather say an artificial leg, a prosthesis). The Buddha emphasized personal improvement, not transfusion of absolute knowledge from an imagined outside authority. Using PM's criterion he would have been a megalomaniac.


<8> [Glenn C Wood :]
Karl Jaspers might appreciate Mr. Mutnick's comments for they seem quite pertinent to a KJ forum. He might also wonder if Mutnick had moved toward some meaningful religious roots as seen in his comment about positing something that "is real (Israel, the spiritual one, not the political)." The comment, though, might suggest revelation through ontology. It relates to Jaspers' comments about the imageless God, and opens the door for a healthy dialogue which should include an awareness of the contents of Jaspers' Philosophical Faith and Revelation.

<9> But his phenomenology feathers into an ontology, i.e., makes the mistake of losing phenomenology as a really functional tool -- like the proverbial monkey-wrench falling into the works. The result seems to conclude in a successful quest for God in the tool, or in the nuts and bolts of the infinite universe.

<10> Mutnick is somewhat correct in that faith is included as an urge in the phenomenological method. However I don't believe any consequential Ontology can be an image or bit of God. Here I'm using the symbol God and acknowledging it's sometimes used to suggest one knows something rather than admitting: "I don't know."

<11> When he says "Müller's claim to a radical phenomenology is ... false, and it is far inferior to the phenomenology of Descartes, much less that of Husserl ..." I say, Thank God phenomenology is not that of Descartes or some interpreters of Husserl. No one owns this tool; not even Heidegger.

<12> Mr. Mutnick must be further complimented, though, for his constant use of ideas that tests KJ forum-ers' appropriation of Jaspers' works and influence. Jaspers also appropriately includes eidetic cases in his General Psychopathology. It does seem beneficial to study and even experience the subjective abnormal phenomena of psychic life for purposes of differentiation -- if there's a difference -- when compared to the phenomena of normal life. Jaspers did both. Some of do too -- as do the abused most ... emphatically.

<13> Finally, his last paragraph amounts to a manifested creed, albeit an uneasy and unnecessary reduction of faith to a statement. It includes fluctuating between the imageless and the image; and the image finally becomes the concentration point needed to remain in contact with the reality's nether side -- immanence. This need should be acknowledged as a fact ... hopefully with the minimum of moral judgement by those not having the need. Here, again, Mr. Mutnick is to be hailed for giving occasion for one -- namely me -- to point to Jaspers as a qualified and trustworthy theologian -- well ... at least a philosophical pastoral counselor.


HALLUCINATIONS, JASPERS NOT CONVOLUTED by Glenn C. Wood, 10 March 2002, posted 2 April 2002, TA45, C34

(If I recall correctly I’m responding to personal e-mail received from Muller—5-8-2006)

<1> Yes, I have noticed what you probably had predicted, that respondents include those who were primarily interested in challenging the posted quickest draw in KJ internet territory; i.e., “doc”, the academic and psychiatric practitioner. The poster would also draw those who uncritically and obsequiously compliment your thinking and then comment further, prospectively counting on your concurrence.

<2> This is to be all the more expected because of the name of Karl Jaspers. He's an extraordinary Challenge. I wonder though and also how much intentional infiltration there might be by institutionalists to obstruct your influence and especially that of Jaspers? I mean if a thinker is to become notable or a real saint without an institution collecting the benefits of confirming Sainthood, that can hardly be permitted. There I go, fluctuating between having some faith in normal phenomenology and being cautiously critical of some institutions' dependence on illusions. On the other hand, to be fair, I've wondered if there might be some infiltrators, like in the institutional church, who want to protect Jaspers from dogmatism.

<3> I do want to respond to the issue of hallucinations and reality. The effort might be attempted, to see what you think. It's too unusual perhaps and more human interest than academic, and might not be worthy of the Forum. It's testimony, and phenomenal to me. I've a very good memory for very early childhood experiences, especially traumatic events.

<4> I resonated with your candid comments about funding for education/research. I thought the same of Stephen Hawking's expressed inappropriate optimism about not ... quite ... having ultimate answers, but that absolute solutions are so near it deserves absolute funding.

<5> Your comment about Jaspers' tendency toward convolution makes it clearer why there's less focus on Jaspers than I might have at first thought. After all, who knows Jaspers? I had -- in the sixties and since -- set out to appropriate Jaspers' as much as possible without losing my individuality -- something he warned against. My approach to your Forum was that the more comparisons with Jaspers, the less occasion for getting bogged down in scientific-like and linguistic-like glossolalia, which tends to screen-out sources potentially beneficial to the mind-brain question. You too, probably, this late in life are willing to take some risks.

<6> So it's understandable if you would decide not to post my comments about the pertinence to Jaspers regarding one of the Forum's commentators.
Jaspers has already conceptually and sagaciously dealt with the question of the influence of mind on infinitesimal phenomena -- in Philosophical Faith and Revelation. It's doubtful that the physicists are aware of this.

<7> Thank you for pointing me toward your Target Article 45. Comparing your views there with Jaspers', as contained in Philosophical Faith and Revelation, I find my view of your views worthy of comparison. An intensity of differences by comparison is probably securely there and measurable, and, without violating an uncertainty principle, determinable.


SOMEONE IS FOOLING ME:ME! by Glenn C. Wood 13 March 2002, posted 16 April 2002, TA45, C35

The meaningfulness of first experiences -- Seemingly the simplicity of the mind-body riddle was somehow missed. It's not new for some having a good memory of early life experiences.

Pertinence -- This being a "Karl Jaspers' forum" the following from his Way To Wisdom seems appropriate to lead us out of this meta-mathematical quandary: "A child cries out in wonderment, "I keep trying to think that I am somebody else, but always myself.' This boy has touched one of the universal sources of certainty, awareness of being through awareness of self. He is perplexed at the mystery of his I, this mystery that can be apprehended through nothing else. Questioningly, he stands before this ultimate reality."

Dissolving the dilemma -- A four-year-old sees the riddle differently. "How can I be me and not my mother, my brother, my sister?" The child then dissolves the question: "I can't be me and they not me" and restructures the problem: "Someone is fooling me!" The child proceeds with life while never forgetting the events surrounding the flash when he or she came out (exist) of being. Eventually, while reading Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and pondering for hours the "I" without turning a page, comes a revelation: "No one was deceiving me. I was fooling myself." The riddle ... exists.

Meta-mathematics -- Some, mature now, still see one and one equals at least two -- epistemologically and philosophically speaking (threw that in to talk the talk). Nothing might be one and something one too, and both are hard to measure especially when one of the two is a healthy self vibrating in degrees between inferior self images and superior self images -- occasionally withdrawing from any self image anxious that someone might measure one for the record.


PERIECHONTOLOGY NOT EPIECHONTOLOGICAL CONVOLUTIONS by Glenn C. Wood 28 March 2002, posted 23 April 2002, TA45, C40

<1> I'd like to comment on Muller's "Against Mind-Independent Smidgens" posted March 26. You said "The mind encompasses but cannot be encompassed." You're responding to Meijden's C28 comment that the mind simply cannot encompass a whole whole. Your statement, it seems to me, ought to be taken in the context of avoiding the ontologizing of smidgens or avoiding ontologizing of the encompassing in which the smidgen tool is used and where phenomena standout in hard to measure amounts. However, for the mind to not be able to encompass a whole whole, one of those wholes would have to be absolutized, ontologized, fixed, objectified; the other whole would be a relative whole.

<2> Though the mind encompasses there is potential for encompassing and this potential can be talked about and around. It's what Jaspers designates as the Encompassing though ineffable and undefinable. The Encompassing is that into which the thoughtful -- those having hit reason's bottom -- can step. Though I've probably stepped out of your quotation's frame of reference, the syntactical dogma--in response to another dogma -- of the sentence is my excuse. The Encompassing becomes encompassing when thought about, thought about for purposes of communication with self and others.

<3> To get right into it; the Encompassing referenced here is that area where we confront the fine distinction between philosophical faith and faith in revelation. For philosophy the Encompassing is nothing, and an honest pragmatic user's more accurate sign would be no-thing. The Encompassing is where faith -- more than less a substitute for nihilism -- flutters and/or waits for refreshing news or assistance for handling correctly the overwhelming encompassings. The Encompasssing's recreation is revelation to the ... individual ... in terms of commitment and response. Jaspers, then, in a sense could be clearer where he says "The philosophical believer cannot preach -- he has nothing to proclaim." (Philosophical Faith and Revelation, Can the two faiths meet?, 2. Conjuring in ciphers and homiletic proclamation.) The philosophical believer does have no-thing to proclaim. The philosopher cannot lose sight of nothing without losing intellectual honesty. And when compared with things, no-thing can be more revealing. "The sight of nothing might give rise to reflection, and this in turn to faith..." (Ibid. only see Common Ground? After Kierkegaard.)

<4> It seems to me that discussion regarding the mind-brain question has exhausted itself as such, though there have been statements calling for practical or religious applications which include the two schools of thoughts: immanentalism and transcendentalism -- isms due to the predicament of thought. The application ought to be gone about religiously, like the way my grandfather bought a farm tractor. He invited several dealers to bring their tractors to one particular field for a plowing contest. The Ford was out-front the others but plowing shallow. In his judgment the John Deere worked best all things considered; it plowed deeply.

<5> Isn't it time to hit the field of reality? It might be a given that psychologists, psychiatrists, and psychopathologists, priests, pastors or chaplains on public payroll, can avoid revelations about the effectiveness of their religious and philosophical plow heads and plowshares due the patient confidentially. But such defense is not a given here in this KJF for it has been demonstrated how easily reality can be circumvented by academicians. There's nothing to defend, and I intend to defend nothing, for until more is revealed from others, I believe -- in the field -- I've more than less experience with nothing.


JASPERS ON: EQUAL FOOTING FOR THE BIBLE by Glenn C. Wood 3 April 2002, posted 23 April 2002, TA45, C42

<1> Van der Meijden seems to be saying there has been some unavoidable arbitrariness in locating the "real" while searching for it in the "beginning" but finds something that "reeks of axiomatics and dogma" in "... Genesis 'In the beginning was the word...' " While recognizing the inescapable need for interpreting phenomena, we should be cognizant that even Biblical phenomena should not be so easily misinterpreted by using an apparent solipsistic standard. Unless one assumes there is a new revelation worthy of reverence in this arbitrary view, Genesis still says something like "In the beginning God ..." and John's Gospel says something like "In the beginning was the word..." Though what's "real" isn't found by figuring out where and how to locate it, if one is going to put forth the effort to find it in a book, care should be taken as to where and how not to locate it.

<2> It is true that John's words might have been responding partly to some ... reeking ... dogmatism of the time, but it is not the beginning of such reality. Meijden almost seems disappointed, though, that neither reality nor the beginning -- a microcosmic bit -- of reality was found ... in the book. At this point I don't know how else to interpret the emotive use of "reeking." It flutters too much.

<3> Though now correctly putting first things first regarding a field of phenomena -- even though a book's data -- it's doubtful any philosophical or metaphysical significance will immediately be seen or felt. However, possible future discussions relative to philosophical faith and revelation, makes it seem appropriate to eliminate or clarify what appears to be subtle biases.

<4> Karl Jaspers says, in philosophy "... interpretation [of] the Bible is not, as a matter of principle, superior to other texts." However, it seems to me it is not to be approached as inferior to other texts and we ought to exercise care while remaining open to not confusing private and real dogmatic experiences with the possible liberating affect of a "biblical faith not yet realized". (Philosophical Faith and Revelation, Creeds and Biblical Religion.)


JASPERS AS SOURCE OF THE FALSIFICATION CONCEPT by Glenn C. Wood, 11 April 2002, posted 23 April 2002, TA45 C43

<1> I apologize for intervening in this dialogue, and ask for your tolerance if the comments hereafter have already been addressed ... and -- elbow, elbow -- satisfactorily resolved. I do find the abbreviations often used are more confusing to me then whole words and might be especially for some others who have ... another life ... and would like to catch-up on the Karl Jaspers Forum's meaningful dialectical flow without subjecting oneself to the tedious effort of avoiding overlooking some absolute truth in what otherwise to me sometimes appears as existential filibustering -- recognizing what's filibustering to me is another's meaningful quest for truth. I'm addressing these comments to you because, at this point you're found easier to understand, and it's easier to focus on an individual without wondering about that's person's spiritual or mental health.

<2> Popper's Overall Insignificance -- First I'd like to make a statement about falsification. In [6] Religion and Scientism you stated that there's a falsification in the "Popper's sense", and in [10] that scientific concepts and theories in the Popper sense "must be falsifiable, but he was a static ontologist: falsification meant that the theory did not represent true MIR." I now confess that until reviewing some of the articles on the KJF I was not aware of falsification in the Popper sense, i.e., that the concept was Popper’s, and certainly not aware that the term might imply that once a proposition was falsified it would then not qualify for reality in the "Popper sense."

<3> An Article using Falsification -- In a recent Target Article routed to you for consideration I used the word "falsification" without reference to Popper. I have been laboring under the impression that the ... concept ... was Jaspers -- while not unaware that Nietzsche was falsification personified -- and upon review of Jaspers works have found in marginal notations I'd placed "falsification" where the concept was used but not the word as such. It was used in his General Psychopathology in the sense that there are often substitutions for normalcy, i.e., the underprivileged make life bearable by a " 'falsification of value scales' (Nietzsche)", and the suppressors as well as the suppressed falsify their scales of value rather than admitting the falsity of their thinking.

<4> I've reviewed my bibliographies for various papers done in Seminary including a Seminar Reading course and paper done in Linguistic Analysis and found nothing regarding Popper, but I could easily have picked up the word and appropriated it and then forgotten the source, but more likely it was another source using the term, such as:

<5> Grosseteste Falsification -- This morning I reviewed A Brief History of Science by A. Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall, 1964, where I'd previously highlighted comments about an Englishman, Robert Grosseteste (c. 1168-1253), particularly: "Grosseteste went further in pointing out that propositions should also be subjected to the test of falsification by experience .... It is often far more decisive to look for the single destructive fact than to pile up more instances of the apparently obvious generalization." (p. 81 Signet) I was in possession of this book before completing the dissertation.

<6> Jaspers' General Psychopathology and Popper -- As mentioned above, Jaspers uses the concept of falsification and it is probably significant that the third edition antedated Popper's by more than a decade. The 1963 English version's index of names does include the single name "Popper" and a page number but nothing pops up there about any Popper. The falsification concept is there but without the ontological "Popper sense." Perhaps the translator included the name in the English index. But to avoid suspicions about conspiracies, perhaps one proficient in German could shed some enlightenment on this index reference by reviewing the German editions before and after 1934. Or perhaps you know where and if it is located. I wonder though why a fixed ontologist would use a falsification process that would shatter the fixation unless working a linguistic twisting spin-off on the functional use of the concept. It could be that Popper disciples try to make Jaspers dependent on Popper like Heideggerians try to make Jaspers dependent of Heidegger. (Jaspers does mention Heidegger ... once ... in the book pointing out his philosophical errors and that Heidegger's efforts end up "obscuring things once more.")

<7> A Personal Falsification -- The Dissertation I did in 1968 did not contain a bibliographical reference to Popper either (and I now realize he did the "famous" work in 1934). I used the concept of falsification throughout that work as part of a systematic hitting-bottom in reason and emotion to show the limits of reason and urges. Then, in a secondary sense -- because I'd started working in the Northwest Indiana Alcoholism Clinic -- the word seemed to fit the clinical setting for if the systematic process could raise the bottom -- as in prior to the alcoholic hitting bottom on skid row -- by showing the limits of rationalizations and reason as such, why wouldn't it work with counseling self and others with regard to the falsification of ideas in particular and general areas of life's consuming struggles.

<8> Five Postulates Falsified -- The first part of the dissertation involved the application of five falsification processes to posited approaches to ultimate situations: 1. Particular and universal falsification of the necessity of seeking the ultimate situation. 2. Particular and universal falsification of the view that Being can be had as an object of thought. 3. Particular and universal falsification of the view that there is no dual aspect to the ultimate situation. 4. Particular and universal falsification of the view that opposes the possibility of the awakening of Existenz in the ultimate situation but not by rising by degrees of perfection. 5. Particular and universal falsification of the view that the ultimate situation cannot be considered as necessary to Existenz.

<9> Understandable Foundering -- This brings me to item [7] and your statement that "All structures...that are claimed to encompass experience are inherently nonsensical" and "to be encompassing they must contain nonsensical elements, which are then asserted to subsume experience within the posited absolutely true structure." You then parenthetically qualify this by saying "the intellectual problem is less difficult in systems which do not posit absolute truths, and instead are centered around practices like meditation, for instance some non-theistic religions. They may not try to eliminate doubt; on the contrary, they sometimes emphasize it, for instance by using Koans."

<10> Nonsensicals are people too -- I don't disagree with the inadequacies of structures, but I wonder about the use of encompassing as something to be done to reality or some part thereof, while possibly and intentionally forgetting that which encompasses objectively and subjectively which cannot become an object of thought. I agree that to encompass a phenomenon nonsensicals are unavoidable (but using the word with great caution for like a recent local Newspaper publisher in the weekly front page gossip column used "nonsensical" because it seemed more emphatic and emotive than the word "nonsense"). I suppose it's an acceptable sort of encompassing in that we superimpose or vignette a gradual abrupt shading off with space about a phenomenon and relate it to our position relative to it -- like timing or measuring it's position to one's position and for particular purposes.

<11> Your comment about "non-theistic religions" is captivating and probably designed to get further response going. "Non-theistic religions" I take to refer to immanently confined meditation, such as concentrating on a point while in repose from the subjective -- as in Objectivity -- and the objective encompassing -- while unintentionally or intentionally forgetting the source of potentiality. Not forgetting requires some responsible tolerance for the convoluting of encompassings, and a willingness to endure the infinity of the finite to some degree not too unlike Nietzsche's idea of the eternal recurrent.

<12> What would your reaction be to a systematic falsification process, at various lengths from twenty-four hours at a time to each moment of time, showing that the mind is absolutely limited -- and without staking claims in the territory of being or Being -- and posited truths would be falsified and therefore shown to be less than absolute? Could you see possibilities here while not categorizing the system as a religion in some traditional or cultural sense?

<13> Another Question and Declaration -- Returning now to [10] you said "religion and similar views differ from science insofar as their aim is global, and they are largely interchangeable. Because of this global aim, they are not mutually exclusive even where they contradict each other in part, they are not, and do not have to be, falsifiable." Further, you said, "but it should be possible to prevent intellectual conflicts, by avoiding absolutes."

<14> How is it that religious views are interchangeable and not exclusive where they can be contrasted by comparisons, while fixated ontologists and functional phenomenologists are separated by a gulf that needs bridging? Perhaps that's an irrelevant question?

<15> Continuing now to interfere in this dialogue, and understanding that you might feel our views are open to criticism and that they can be subject at least to some disproof, I'm wondering: How could one intellectually and without withdrawing from the encompassings avoid dogmatics or absolutes without a falsification process?

<16> I take it you mean religions exists universally, for human kind has extended beyond the globe, and you might mean they have a universal goal, such as proselytizing like one might attempt to persuade others about the dangers of localizing the mind to the brain. And let's face it : Iconology and ontology are closely related and the struggle with them is historic and religious -- and we are getting close to dragging ourselves into the ruckus, maybe.

<17> Religion, to me, from a historical conservative and Biblical perspective, is primarily individual rather than universal. If there's to be a revival of mankind it must begin within each individual. It becomes universal, then, as a goal. The mysterious ground of the philosophy and psychology of that religious subjective emphasis is reasonably determinable; meaning we should be able to come to therapeutic terms around and about it.


COMING AND GOING ENCOMPASSING RIPPLES by Glenn C. Wood 1 May 2002, posted 21 May 2002, TA45, C49

[ Peter Mutnick] "Those who think they have no need of salvation by the transcendental God truly have more need than any of the rest of us, who are realistic enough to recognize our need. ]

[ Wood's Response ]

We, it seems to me, have incalculable (more like twoish + twoish = fourish more or less) need for good faith in Transcendence including when, or, as self-consciousness is reduced to only occasional dysfunctional inferior and superior self images -- Transcendence meaning the Encompassing as such, the Encompassing of every Encompassing, and this Transcendence is the Transcendence of all Transcendence. Such coming-and-going circular ripples of experience, in the deciphering of the dynamic flux, have therapeutic value as we think and feel -- they prevent the congealing of thoughts and feelings, though sometimes reveal and support an immediate congealing for some purpose.

I'm comfortable with the proper use of the word "God" (in whatever written and unwritten language, needless to say) for it fits my culture and stands for the invisible but trustworthy, and points toward not only the most respectable ideas and feelings but that which goes beyond them as ... mysterious ... source and is not irrelevant to human historical phenomena. However, without easily getting case-history specific, one abused by an authority which or who frequently uttered "God" hypocritically certainly contributes to a fixating aversion to all that a name could and should mean. The word inhibits the recovering processes for some alcoholics. That's why in Alcoholics Anonymous in the Twelve Step therapy process the word "God" is not mentioned until at least two steps have been taken in the forward movement toward sanity. One's unity of thought needs dissolving constantly, or shattered by confrontation with experience. The unity of thought is in a constant state of dissolution by those with learned ignorance. Even transcendent crystallized thoughts need to be brought down for shattering.

Though I like the use of the word, it seems so often used as a substitute for honest or further honest thinking -- or further abuse. That has led me in the past while conversing with fellow seminarians to avoid the word or say something like "Do you agree God is not a thing?" Then: "God is no-thing!" "God is nothing ...?" or say: "God is no-where and now-here." That's not designed to support or enforce an obvious dysfunctional unity of thought, needless to say.

Some have need more than others for hopeful images of a home-life and idealistic worldviews, and revelations from the clear and distinct. Some see through images and the worldviews and find more revealed in the mystery than in the apparent clear and distinct. The latter are probably relatively comfortable in life, and the former perhaps nailed to particular existents. It might be easier for the secure to be tolerant and nonjudgmental, but there's ample precedent for even the uncomfortable clinging to floating debris to be longsuffering while nonjudgmental toward those lost souls singing while sinking "Nearer, my God, to Thee."

Thanks for the occasion your comment presented.


MULLER MISUNDERSTANDS POPPER, CHALLENGER DISASTER by Glenn C. Wood 3 May 2002, posted 21 May 2002, TA45, C50

I'm still striving for enlightenment about the way in which falsification is used in the "Popper sense." In [4] Muller states "Popper's emphasis on falsification implied static ontology. To falsify a theory meant for him to show that it did not represent or approach mind-independently pre-structured reality (MIR), which is a fiction." I thought these words -- with the first reading, all right, I mean study -- were properly comprehended, meaning: Popper had a fixed ontology which if an idea didn't fit, the idea was false. This interpretation also seemed consistent with "Popper said scientific concepts and theories must be falsifiable, but he was a static ontologist: falsification meant the theory did not represent true MIR."

However, this morning I was finally reviewing a 1954 required textbook, Contemporary Philosophy, a Book of Readings, edited by Jarrett and McMurrin, University of Utah. The book contained a section on the meaning of history from Popper's work (1945 rev. 1952) "The Open Society and Its Enemies." I could find nothing that indicated a commitment to a fixed ontology, and one would expect to find it in the tools used for such a subject as the meaning of history. I would be surprised to find an absolutized interpretation of Being or being, unless...he went through one of those conversions to intitutionalism or scientism which depends on a clear and distinct ontology and membership requires a yielding to secular or parochial authority.

That, seeming unlikely, I returned to Muller's first quote above, while thankful that he had not succumbed to the suggestion that he define the indefinable definitively, thus leaving room for further communication, for it's doubtful Muller is ever wholly wrong, and if wholly right we should either ignore him, put him away, or bow to his holiness (he's not completely correct in saying 2 plus 2 doesn't equal five, 2 and 2 equals most of 5--in that frame of reference). Anyway, paying special attention to the words "implied ontology" and especially to how "mind-independently" is a modification of the "pre-structured reality" I then interpreted Muller as saying that Popper's falsification applies to thought as such for it is always qualified by fiction especially more so when one says it's void of fiction -- hallucinations due to certain trauma notwithstanding.

Falsification works to show a theory is testable: Like this theory: The space vehicle Challenger is as safe as it can be for you. That theory qualified for falsification because testable, and could easily have been placed back in the shed. But It was "go," viable, in a way which ignored a single frigid fact--at least one encompassing O-ring. (We won't talk yet about Apollo 13 or ... MIR)

This example would be relatively consistent with these quotes by Popper: "Neither nature nor history can tell us what we ought to do" and that in our decisions relative to facts "we do not need certainty" and "facts as such have no meaning" but rather a "sober combination of individualism and altruism" and "the dualism of facts and decisions" have something to do with progress or meaningful process. But then he sees real value in history, in "the life of the forgotten, of the unknown individual..." These are not original ideas with Popper, but neither do they appear to indicate a fixed ontology as I had suspected.

I didn't put quotes in my notes around this quote but it's almost good: The willingness to use falsification shows the degree of trust that theories will work properly. Only, with the Challenger the proposition was falsified out of existence--rather than placed back in shed -- by misplaced trust in the method of falsification. Though there's some uncertainty about the thickness of the tolerance encompassing this statement that "Popper said that scientific concepts and theories must be falsifiable, but he was a static ontologist. Falsification meant that the theory did not represent true MIR [mind-independent reality--Wood's brackets]." But that makes sense if we understand...true...reality is unavoidably represented and that Muller and Popper share the understanding. Muller might be thinking only in terms of a functional fixed ontology in an encompassing out-there, while I am thinking of a ontological flux out there and subjectively too.

Anyone should feel free to point out my misinformation, lack of information, shallowness, misquotes, irrelevance etc. for I don't mind making mistakes as long as they are not intentional, and praise in folly is not sought. The KJF editor should feel free to edit at will too, for sometimes I get carried away in an effort to enjoy the dialectical process by taking poetical flights. Otherwise I'll be a little content in thinking that the proper Popper "fixed ontology" and the demarcation with Muller's functional ontology is finer than a frog's hair on a rotating-vacillating encompassing -- whereupon any KJF song-and-dance team couldn't avoid tip-toeing on myth and science simultaneously.


JESUS MADE GOOD ON STATEMENTS 8 May 2002, posted 28 May 2002 by Glenn C. Wood, TA45, C52

Meijden's "Amen..." reaction to Jaspers' statement that the philosophical believer has nothing to proclaim inspires me to say that Socrates (presuming he was not a fictitious character) and Jesus made good on their statements -- completed their statements as ultimately as possible -- in the field. Their words were definite enough that authorities and scriveners lost patience. I can think of nothing more morally whole than that individual-sort-of-dying for justice and mercy -- for what to many seems like maybe they received proper treatment. Learning something meaningful from nothing was the other quote from Jaspers -- completing, I think, his point on the value of nothingness in the peripheral areas of philosophical thinking. Of course that nothingness is relevant to the primary and secondary qualities of the inner eye.

As far as enumerating assumptions beside the names of KJF contributors, it doesn't seem necessary to measure the "cosmic mind" but one measurement of an affirmed localized exact representation ought to suffice to toss the word back into the arena of nothingness for restructuring. Thanks for your comment.


SUBJECTIVISM IS LESS THAN NATURAL by Glenn C Wood 10 May 2002, posted 4 June 2002, TA45, C54

<1> I'd like to thank H. Muller for the responses to my questions and especially for his pointed questions: What does the field of reality mean and does it include experience with no-thing? What do I mean by subjective and objective encompassing? What is meant by: the mysterious ground is reasonably determinable? Could the need for interpreting phenomena be specified?

The first question was prompted by my comment about the use of abbreviated symbols by the KJF contributors. I recognize that as my problem, for, in presentations you and others do in as much as possible define them. MIR (mind-independent reality) has to be translated by me to M-I R (with the hyphen and the space) and it requires an unnatural twist -- possibly a handicap -- to identify with it.

<3> Reality unless defined should be taken in a dictionary sense rather than a particular or universal epistemological school of thought about the real and the ideal. My reference to hitting the field of reality appears stilted, and suggests that what has occurred in the Forum is not the field of reality. Confession of presumptiveness: I don't know your field but wonder if it is formula-orientated in the sense of research and experimentation that is more rather than not mathematically real. It is hard to measure nothing, but no-thing is closer to being measurable and approaches the experience of nothing as more comparable to experience with things.

<4> No-thing is philosophical in that one cannot have wisdom by ignoring what we call upon to distinguish one thing from another; I mean no-thing is not imaginable unless accompanied by thing. No-thing is also metaphysical but participates also in what is not personally known and knowable. To that degree of participation in the metaphysical and philosophical, no-thing is indeed unavoidable in any field. Once the function of no-thing is established the prop, the hyphen, can be cautiously removed.


To drive home the point of reality, I'd like to refer you to the early childhood experience with the sewing machine (I ran the needle through my finger). I would normally not reveal those early experiences for it's too much to ask others to give it credence; for there's no way to verify it for the community. I read though that you were interested in memory, and thought that though there's no way to measure or verify the data -- which might therefore remove it from your interests -- it might be of value. I mean, if there would have been some means of determining brain processes prior to the sewing machine episode, during, and after, there would be some interesting comparisons, but it still would not mean anything more than a thimble full of ocean water in search of fresh water. And the apparatus would have had to remain attached to me till now in hopes of determining how much has been confabulated or embellish, and whether memory and interpretation of memorial phenomena had been influenced by the apparatus -- like if I owned shares in the company.

<6> Karl Jaspers wrote that boundless understanding is a wonderful human possibility only if the understanding one lives is a faith of one's own, which in turn can only be drawn from the roots of one's own tradition, and he referred to this as experience. From my experience here are a few brains in the field of reality. Many years ago a priest in Gary Indiana was attacked and suffered sever head injury and the Gary Post Tribune further reported that specialists had concluded that he would not be able to talk again due to the particular area of the brain damaged. I followed the story because of my interest in the possibility that the mysterious nature of the mind and brain could not be so clearly localized in part of the brain. His speech ability returned, so it was reported. That did not prove anything, for perhaps there was a lot subconscious embellishing of data to establish a miracle so as to add to the authority of the priestly establishment. But it is data in my field.

<7> For many years my son was caretaker for a WWII Vet classified as totally disabled from an injury to the left frontal area of the head resulting in the loss of the eye and brain matter. He compensated for abnormality by keeping detailed daily records to maintain orientation and function, and by immersion into painting. Other than a few apparent abstract pieces, his art was done my guides and measurements. He had compensated so well for his loss that if his flattened (steel plate had been removed due to infection) forehead and laughter had not been so obvious he might have been classified otherwise than totally disabled. We still have an artifact, a piece of the skull he saved. When a health care provider, hospital, had seemingly caused the death of his 94 year old wife, representatives made a quick settlement to avoid litigation due in part to his thorough recording of daily events. This is reality.


I had guessed you would zero in on that word "determinable," for right after typing it I thought of that research once done on Augustine, and how I'd concluded that I was an indeterminist compared to his determinism. The use of "determine" is relative to a real frame of reference and has nothing to do with faith or knowledge in the area of predestination. It refers to taking what is not understood but yet given terms as though it is understood, and then de-termed as in deconstruction and then coming to realistic terms with it again without risk of appealing to the mysterious to justify improprieties.

<9> But "mystery" does have an unusual meaning to me, perhaps. By the mystery revealed I mean the mystery remains obvious and therefore has meaning as a mystery, though like no-thing, mystery must be reality testable by honest experience not by an authority judging what is mysterious enough to become a fixed miracle. The ground of mystery therefore has two, pardon me, twoish potential grounds: the ground of testing, and the ground where mystery as content is allowed to flourish. The ground of the latter is the myth area, that's the ground where mystery abides. If I remember correctly that was the point of difference between Karl Jaspers and Rudolf Bultmann in their debate over the possibility of religion without myth (Myth and Christianity). In that debate Jaspers behaved himself more like a theologian than the Theologian Bultmann. The ground of myth had been well defended and shown by Jaspers to be essential to religion and philosophy. I'm writing off the cuff here.


To appropriate Jaspers flow of thinking, I had to adjust to using concepts with a sense of unity equaled by flexibility, and individualized in my own history. He had found 5 to 7 forms useful in handling experience. I had to visualize spheres of categories or forms that would overlap, separate, superimpose, and be elastic as well as occasionally congealing … It appealed to me for my personal history, like early childhood memories, seemed to be best handled with those flexible forms of thinking. If we are going to allow a functional distinction between subject and object and apply linguistic order to the duality, if objective experience is going to visualized within an encompassing, then subjective experience should be visualized in an encompassing too. Both encompassings can be given objectivity, and due to mystery both can ultimately be respected as ground or potential source to the point of giving a higher case E and O to various intensities of … phenomena. Therefore, I sense that you lean more toward one encompassing than I and that I by comparison lean more to the other. But this phenomenon can be interpreted by understanding the peculiarities in our histories, and that I need to learn from your laboratory what I've lacked in my field. (Linguistically, with regard to syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics, the subject is not subject to objects, but is subject to Objectivity from both Encompassings but that is a matter of faith resulting in extraordinary individual activity perhaps.)


I really cannot identify with the question but perhaps I've left something out. It's probably something strange to someone engaged in formulas that either work or don't work -- ad hoc and carte blanche. I cannot imagine a mental structure that is so fixed that it precludes critical interpretation. Nietzsche probably had more to say before and after the statement that the apparent world is the only one, and one could probably find where he had hopes that the one world was more apparent than real. So … I'm going to, with you, approach that question like a bomb ready to detonate, and conclude with a question: Could you give an example that I (in English and in terms that a farm boy and preacher's son schooled in a fundamentalist seminary with no interest in the Hebrew language and after two successful years of Greek language lost interest and can't even say the alphabet now) could comprehend of a structure with no external referents that could not be subject to interpretation? I guess if there's an external referent the necessary mode of interpretation would have to be applied and at least manifested in the caution with which one moves ahead in the face of uncertainty.


PERIECH-ENLIGHTENMENT ON PERIECHONTOLOGY by Glenn C. Wood 5 Jun 2002, posted 18 June 2002, TA45, C61

Wood's response to Muller's response 9 (to C50 by Wood)

<1> Your research into Popper's use of ontology was very helpful in the forming of the understanding I now have -- some of which I'll now share.

<2> In time it will become clearer to me why you might see Popper did not distance himself far enough from an ontology, whereas to me Popper rather distanced himself from the positivists' take-off on Wittgenstein's work regarding linguistics and what symbols promised regarding Being or some parts of Being. The ... caution ... Popper seems to take to the real seems to me to be a carefulness not to overlook the often-overlooked individual histories -- a part of the field of reality.

<3> Some might say that I too use the word ontology in a traditional way but without giving mode or explanation to Being that could amount to more than ... nothing. I'm sure we both know the meanings since the word was first used by Clauberg, the thought-form being earlier such as with Aquinas and Anselm, now including the current varying meanings. We could even go back to the Biblical John who wrote about the logos, the word at that time having a meaning that not only included the Greek concept of reason but also the Jewish thought and feeling about the soul and the animating breath of God. The ontologistic meaning of John though included the image-less God, and the Word -- Jesus -- was one encompassed by image-lessness from the mysterious birth, the transfiguration, to the resurrection; these are forms of thinking we can apply to our individual experiences of self-hood.

<4> If we were to insist on a definition and insist on no departure from it we would be so polarized or agreeable that no transcending dialogue would result. The best we could come up with in the way of an objective standard would be to take the meanings given to "ontology" by Karl Jaspers beginning with his first work in psychopathology and ending with his work in philosophical faith and revelation.

<5> Although Jaspers' encompassings and transcendences prevent ontologism, he appears to have found the need to use another word to therapeutically point away from the images of ontologisms; it's the word periechontology (p. 82 and 201ff in Philosophical Faith and Revelation, Collins, St. James's Place, London).

Periechontology throws us back into the encompassing which can never be fully conceived or perceived. Here the preposition prefix means encompassing and can apply to the genitive and accusative, and in composition means what one encompasses in objective ways and what one is encompassed by.

<7> But Periechontology, though it rationally shatters ontologisms, is not the source of revelation that provides certitude for action in precarious human situations -- those unpredictable heroic actions without rhythm nor normal reason. (We will get closer to that reference context when dealing with Jaspers' use of Cipher.)

<8> In [3] you stated that Wood gives demonstrations that are purely functional; you say that shows that MIR assumption is not needed for a test of the Challenger's viability. I'm uncertain whether that is a criticism or an agreement. But it seems MIR (mind-independent of reality) was the cause of the disaster and the poor reason for not placing the thing back in the shed, and that my demonstration was to show what reality is like. Even a naive realist would not exclude the bereaved from a reality created by careless minds' independent of humane realities.

<9> In [4] you say that my "falsified out of existence" is "somewhat misleading." I'll give you the benefit of trust that that is not an accusation of intellectual dishonesty. I think I was trying to say that the Challenger and crew were falsified out of existence meaning: they died, not just put back on the shelf or in the shed. I was trying to show they were falsified out of existence and sent back into Being by a poor way to falsify the proposition that the Challenger was viable.

Finally, regarding an ontological flux out-there and an encompassing out-there you say you "do not understand." I don't understand your not understanding, but look forward to figuring this thing out. I would at this point refer back to that early memory with the sewing machine (TA 45 C44 Wood to McCarthy (31) (15/30 April 2002)), which seems like a good starting point for my education, but it still comes up "page cannot be found." I asked there for assistance in applying certain KJF often-used concepts to an early-life experience to see if I understand the way the concepts are used.

<11> Notation: Perhaps I'm using too much space and time in the KJF. Anyway I'll be involved in another project during the next few weeks, but looking forward to reviewing articles and some responding. Thanks for your professionalism.


BEGINNING DEBATE ON ABSTRACT THEORY’S EVOLUTIONISM by Glenn C. Wood 7 August 2002, posted 13 August 2002, TA45, C70

Comment by Wood on TA45 C68 by Johnson

Mr. Johnson's comments are interesting partly because he speaks from a half century of thought and experience. It would be interesting to know more specifically what he has done in the field of engineering too. Too, I mean, other than that intriguing comment about a half-century-old experience which altered his state -- of mind and emotions I presume -- that was of a spontaneous wordless visual impression. That is; please clarify if it is something that can be shared in some transcendental manner in terms of propriety.

His interests in world views are relevant to Karl Jaspers Forum because of the easy comparation with Jaspers work in that area, for it was during his years of hiding during WW II that he did his work on world views, in which he paraded them before us so we could see the limits by comparisons. He had an excellent viewing point, an unusual perspective for being capable of seeing the results of certain world views at work at the time.

Mr. Johnson correctly says few people have anything like a complete worldview and that most wouldn't venture a guess as to how it all fits together. Some would say that venturing such a guess is the result of a "post modern" movement of thought which amounts to a commitment to nothing which is really a begging of the question to say the least, and the least said about post-modernity the sooner it will be reabsorbed into meaninglessness. However, without giving post-modernity a smidgen of credit, we could be more correct than incorrect in saying that if one has found a world-view that fits everything together in a normally acceptable manner, there is no further need for discussion but rather a bowing, condescending, to a clearly understood world view.

There is to me a clue to some dangerous dogmatism though in the words that a world view is either all right or all wrong especially when backed by a sophisticated technical apparatus or engine of performance where vagueness or uncertainty is inherent but probability is given absolute status. How an engineer could think in such absolute terms is a bit of a wonder, for ... nothing ... lasts forever and some things never do.

The form of thought is not flawed, that is, the two categories of right and wrong, for we use them all the time in treatment of others, in judgment of ourselves, and in conduct when convenient. In religion, the absolute judgment is phrased like: vengeance is mine says the Lord, or something like the words "justice will ultimately prevail."

It appears that the either wholly right or wrong forms of thinking have leaked into subatomic world of visualizations, and though uncertainties exist there, the minuteness of the phenomena makes it easy to conclude a maximum of certainty regarding the origin and goal of mankind.

This is not to say there is no worthwhile world view. If anyone has been following my efforts on the KJF, a world view could be seen coming into focus -- slowly. The world-view needs a standard, to this some few would agree. It can be unfair to experience and then disallow uncertainty, and it can be unfair to experience a need for faith in God and then substitute that by a faith in some thing of an objective or subjective nature."

Mr. Johnson mentions, if I understand him correctly, a certain essential value from quantum mechanics and that such has brought to him an understanding of the evolution of man. He probably has some engineering experience that involves quantum theory that makes him feel this way. It will make an interesting analysis especially coming from one whose language does not require a graduate course in some special field where complex terms eliminate those with practical experience.

I've been a little reluctant to get involved in a meaningless dialogue about creationism or evolutionism. Probably it would be most meaningful to say what Jaspers has to say about it, and from the top of that edifice then decide whether to ascend, float, or descend, or do all of that without losing contact with the relativity of reality.

In conclusion, this comment can be taken as an effort to "get it" and possibly challenge "it." I have read your TA45 C58 and find the concepts clear, though still subject to interpretation thank God. Your writing is clear. Reminds me a little of "Pierre" Teilhard De Chardin. There's no doubt about your ontological commitment, and the clarity with which you will to defend, though I'd guess through circular reasoning that evades the catastrophic world situation which too clearly challenges the immanental and religious faith that the mind must survive to carry forward the creative refinement of natural order (or words to that effect I think in <6> or thereafter), though that might be more a matter of hope on your part than the consequence of a revelation of progressive evolution--a revelation from the "natural order."

Obviously, your commitment to the natural order and the organizational response more than suggests that a religious ordering system is an essential part of your world-view which is not unrelated to "religious intuition.


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