A TWEAKED CRITIQUE OF CHRIS THORNHILL’S STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA’S ARTICLE ON KARL JASPERS (mentioning other Glasgow notables including Thomas and Alexander Campbell; and NY University John Draper and others. (Routed for posting 5-11-08, posted 5-12-08)



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Notation: Some real-case samples demonstrating the reason for this critique can be found at UPDATE 37.1 That Update will reveal what is at stake and why some tweaking might avoid interpretations of Chris’ words that don’t do justice to Jaspers’ views--from my perspective. I do not have the restraints of space like Chris might have had, so I have an advantage; well, it might be a handicap where communication is concerned, for few will read it anyway (It is safer to be obscure if one is radically independent). I apologize for taking website-liberties and setting-up Chris’ article for my agenda, but he has publicly reached the level that some purposive abuse can be ignored.


0. Adjusting the critiquing tweaking tool
1.1. Ken Miller’s battle-banner waving is a rally cry to arms
1.2. “Vaticenglish”—Comparable to the shock Jaspers received
1.3. Chris’ “originary”, my “origin-sin”, a Glasgow alumnus’ erroneous “St. Origin”
1.4. Can’t say what Chris’ position is but there’s a loss of meaningfulness, watch how:
1.5. The “e” word is used in the first sentence of his second paragraph, watch this:
1.6. The next “e” use shows the mission in e-motion
1.7. Note the use of “e” to describe the origin of consciousness
1.8. Anlage: There are limits to being conscious of consciousness
2. But these “origin” forces going-foul are not new and can be found in Glasgow and Oxford
2.1. Glasgow v. Oxford against the Scottish Reformation
3. Alexander Campbell, Glasgow alumnus
4. Glasgow associates materializing: Peter J. Bussey, Ramona Fotiade, Chris Thornhill, and early 19th century’s Thomas and Alexander Campbell
4.1. Chris is known through the KJSNA etc.
5. NewYork University’s William Barrett, Hugh Kelly, and John Draper (following the school trail)
5.1. Hugh Kelly (NY U) stops short of such Heideggerism
5.2. John W. Draper, New York University at Oxford
6. Neither Hegel nor Heidegger “I-influenced Jaspers (in the “D-day sense)
7. Chris Thornhill’s “originary”
7.1. My “Origin-sin”
7.2. Campbell’s “St. Origin” slip, the challenge to Rome
7.3. In his footnote Campbell describes knowledge
7.4. The sudden growth of the Church of Christ by dissenters from the Scottish Church
7.5. The dialectical thesis, antithesis, and synthesis of the three “origins”
7.6. The sudden burst, origin, of Glasgow personages are not miraculous apparitions
8. The suggestibility of Hegel and Kierkegaard’s influence on Jaspers in the Stanford piece
8.1. Why Kierkegaard became popular and why Jaspers had to evaluate
8.2. Jaspers realized the significance of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche 1913, 1914, 1915, 1919
8.3. Those Jaspers’ lectures surely alerted the forces
8.4. Chris’ “evolution” paragraph regarding Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger
8.5. Kierkegaard and Campbell, different situations
8.6. Hegel’s dialectical idea-ism and the easy slip into dialectical materialism is not something Jaspers slipped up on
9. Appendix—Campbell’s thoughts referred to above can be found in book printed by James and Gazlay, 1836 (Cincinnati, Ohio)
10. Corrections and apologies if and as needed

0. Adjusting the tweaking tool—“Even the most modest contrast, once it has become conscious, gains a compelling force.” (GP, p.344) “Our intellect identifies the infinite transformations of the basic phenomenon wherever it appears, and grasps it, bringing it into being within itself.” (p. 341) Such quotations are offered to describe my critique’s hoped for conscience. Such a presumptuous conscientiousness ought not inhibit an attitudinal consciousness such as involved in the caveat: the “Dialectical transformation is a universal and basic form of thought in contrast with rational understanding, which it [rational understanding] uses and surpasses”. (p.343) This caveat-quote can mark the distinction between Hegelianism and Jaspers’ retrospective evaluation of Hegel, the whole Hegel idea-system as captured and used by various named and unnamed forces. Jaspers’ reasoning about Hegel might be a good example of how the difference between vernunft (dialectical transformation) and verstehen (rational understanding) might work—if a difference is needed for some justifiable purpose. In other words there is nothing wrong or illogical about having a systematic dialectical ideology; it’s just that it should not be transferred irresponsibly or unrealistically to nature. The tweaking-tool will be searching for delicate symbols of such projections.

1. A moistened fingertip put to the cybersphere—It is unfortunate that persuasive sidewinder intolerable forces must come into play in this critique of the Stanford Encyclopedia’s “Karl Jaspers”. The unprecedented immediacy of available information on the Internet’s electric highway reveals these forces. Let’s get a sense of it: Except for the recent interview that Ben Stein, (affirmed-jewish) had with Glenn Beck (affirmed-mormon) I know nothing about the contents of “Expelled: no intelligence allowed”—but appreciate the denominational confessions except for however much could be turf-like boasting. I understand it has a part to play in the denominational skirmish over the American soul, and that it relates to those other powers, those nameless other denominations hidden by collusion, that metamorphose themselves and slip away into the infinite metamorphologies some of which Jaspers elucidates in Part Five of Man In The Modern Age (@179). Regardful of the staggering amount of information available, there’s a statement by Jaspers still true today: “What we can know of the universe does not tell us how we come to think, and thus to know.” (p.129, Philosophy and the World)

1.1. Ken Miller’s battle-banner waving is a rally cry to arms around the “e-flag”--an origin-game put to placard and turned into false knowledge (Jaspers: p. 128 “The Creation of the World” Philosophy and the World). His war-declaration, “Only a Theory: Evolution and the Battle for America’s Soul” captures in part the uniformed part he plays as a “papist” General determining the terms of engagement.  And, it seems to me to be popularly clear that the well financed “Bishop of ‘e’” Richard Dawkins has made it known directly from Oxford’s Simonyi-chair of philosophical naturalism that his arch-mission will not stop with anything less than a nationalized naturalism--comparable to a misunderstood but World-War effective National-Socialistic Nietzschean-superman’s proneness for sacrificing due moral process. The transformation from normal concerns to  “e-motional” urges (“evolution”) are by appearance becoming less militant—perhaps per Oxford ultimatum. It is more and more obvious that the 999% gap between Richard and “bonobos” is a dissimilarity his dialectical materialism finds harder to defend without losing the percentage advantage. If I recall correctly he sings in a choir somewhere near where the martyrs were burned by primates, so an adjustment can be made back to 1000+%--unless bonobos are singing too. Enough already…..

1.2. “Vaticenglish”--Comparable to the shock Jaspers received when hearing about the support Hitler received (and with no 9-1-1 access), Jaspers philosophically understood it as one of the nameable forces. By comparison the Vatican intervention of 1996 is shocking to some while enrapturing to the majority. Stephen Gould was biologically and correctly interpreting the intrusion as scientific dogma, an e-creed, namely that “Sincere Christians must now accept [the Vatican’s imposing position] evolution…as an effectively proven fact.” (p.280 Worms) Gould’s approbation of the diet-miracle, the apparition of primate supermen with revelational authority, makes it seem more than purely rational to approach Chris’ description of Jaspers’ views with a reasonable degree of sensitivity to these forces while conscious of the historical evidence regarding the exploitation of nomenclature. The use of this “e” word has reached a new level of deterioration since the 1996 “Encyclical”. What we have now is “Post Encyclical Evolution” (PEE). Whenever the “e” word is now used it points at the Vatican as the sacrosanct inforcement of the words use. One is suppose to feel obligated now to speak Vaticenglish and address change over time as “father e” (Santa FE). Viva la FE sounds better than the alternative.

1.3. Chris’ “originary”, my “origin-sin”, a Glasgow alumnus’ erroneous “St. Origin”—Ambiguous origin-terms likeFormation of human consciousness” “consciousness gradually evolves” “emergence of self-consciousness” are found in Chris’ article. Ambiguity in language is unavoidable but balanced judgments need to be sensitive to variable forces. To avoid immanental vitalism it is vital and vitalizing that this sort of wording not be interpreted to mean that Jaspers claimed to know anything essential about the origin of humankind. Today there are forces vying for possession of personages in updated struggles for power, and these state-of-the-arts efforts must not be unchallenged. Jaspers does not delimit the limits of being conscious of consciousness and to make “nirvana” inevitable, or, so that there can be transcending to the knowledge about the ground consciousness. More below about “originary” [sic], “origin-sin” [sic], and “St. Origin [sic].

1.4. I am not saying what Chris’ position is but to me there’s loss meaningfulness, for there are words such as (like “crusade”, though not in his article) “evolution” and now even the word “dialectical” that can short-circuit understanding. Forces abuse the words. The protestant Hegel’s dialectic can be spun like a gutter ball in the next isle into a strike for dialectical materialism to show that he sort of ratified, then, what is now understood as kowtowing to eternal vatic authority codified publicly 10-96. The two words “evolution” and “dialectical” are mentioned because they are in the Stanford article—whether due to editing I know not. My position though is that when Chris uses the “e” (whether “evolution” or “emergent”) word the proposition loses meaningfulness and goes to meaninglessness. I hope to show where that occurs.

1.5.The “e” word is used in the first sentence of his second paragraph and establishes a certain appellate jurisdiction, used along with the appellative “importance” thereby making an appeal to the emotions rather than describing the individual meaningfulness that Jaspers brings to the history of philosophy and “political theory”. The next appellation is “twentieth-century”—dated merely by a few years from the twenty-first century. There is no escaping the idea that when the “e” word is used it currently has turf-significance; it’s graffiti that means the user is committed to the mission-statement that genetic changes over time and morphological survival is due to situations that favor a new species of consciousness. That bad biological paradigmatic iconic “e” appears to be intentionally chosen to describe Jaspers’ contributions and it leaves room then for a hero with an “e” drawl to rescue Jaspers and show how in detail the “e” word explicitly applies and fits a conjured social-stratums’ archeology. Whenever the iconic “e” is raised it affects and inhibits the reader similarly to using “id” (intelligent design) to describe Jaspers’ philosophy and political theory.  Due to some contemporary usage “id” could be an in-your-face tactic manifesting an occidental mission of exclusivity that colors history with poorly motivated biblical colors and at the intentional expense of all others. To use an “id” creed would diminish the meaning Jaspers attaches to the psychology of the “The Creation of the World” (Part III, Philosophy and the world). So, due to my kind nature I do not impose that phrase onto others, but will show Jaspers’ position from a professional psychopathological perspective.  

1.6. The next “e” use shows the mission in e-motion (praxis? i.e. practical app): “[Jaspers’] entire philosophical evolution was motivated by…” others listed in that paragraph by Chris. Note how the word “entire” (fully distributed) naturally…emerges…fully specialized when the “e” icon is flashed. An effort is made to fit Jaspers, as an artifact, into space and time and thereby show a condition of dependence that minimizes the inspiration side of Existenz, and the individual historicity (the individual always perennially introduced to historical processes). But elsewhere Chris demonstrates a clear understanding of Existenz but seems to “e”-forget quickly that inspiration is a matter of individual phenomena not a geo-centrally located factory-producing miraculous revelation. Again, though, there are uneasy dis-ambiguous reasons to think Chris eschews this e-motion, so the point here is to show that the “e” word is used with less care then needed today and suggests an academic stance in the brawl, speaking that Vaticenglish as an in-thing. Chris’ further use of the “e” word involves, suggests, the same sort of emotive wonderings. That thinking results in a genetic-error when Chris subjects Jaspers to too much dependence on Hegel--thus completing the “e” picture with strokes that catch Jaspers up in the movement from dialectical idealism to dialectical materialism and suspended on philosophical naturalism. To Kaufmann’s charge that Jaspers tries to unite Nietzsche with the ancients, Jaspers warns against taking “philosophers as combinations and syntheses” (p. 861 Reply). Philosophers are distinguished by a comparative difference without those limiting empirical causal connections. Perhaps I’m offering Chris up as a sacrifice for the occasion to quote Jaspers and to emphasize the need to be more individualistically historical.

1.7. Note the use of “e” to describe the origin of consciousness—Chris introduces Jaspers’ “Philosophie” as clinching an “e-motion” (flashing the icon). He says “Philosophie” is “designed to show how human existence and human knowledge necessarily progress from one level of being and one level of knowledge to another, and how consciousness gradually evolves…” Now, enough said, there, to show the likely dysfunctional side of “e-motion” (the best eye on the icon and the other on Jaspers). Chris goes on to mention the self’s confrontation with its limits by facing the antinomies of life. But the problem here is that Jaspers is being shown as having a grasp (Chris’ “originary” [sic] leaning) of humankind’s origin through some solely systematic process of coming to terms with limits. In answer to this “evolution” of consciousness association, one need only go to the later reply in the Lib. of Liv. Phil. There Latzel’s understanding of Philosophie meets Jaspers’ approval. As a matter of fact Jaspers says that Kaufmann is the “precisely” opposite side of Latzel (861, f). Latzel begins the system of limitations by coming to terms with the limits of reason itself, and there is no turf, or e-motion, or icon that can pass that test—no historical determination can overcome the limits of thinking and the unlimited need to learn what history, especially earliest known historical records, can teach. Jaspers not only systematically shows the natural limits of reason but also the limits of feelings or emotion. History a major role, including biblical history, in this non-“evolving” constant; the constant is that the historical individual’s contribution is primarily individualistic and descriptive enough to be easily identified with in each individual’s open-ended authentic self-hood way of thinking (the individual is always more or less than any moment’s self image). The emphasis is on the role of conversion in the human epoch and direct access by God with the receptive individual and the hubris of the individual is zilch. My main point here is that is not clear whether Chris would stand with Kaufmann or lean toward Latzel while flashing that “e” word.

1.8.  Anlage: There are limits to being conscious (existential—another “e” word) of consciousness (Being as such), limits that, with intellectual dishonesty, can be delimited in the words “emergence of self-consciousness” if by emergence is meant to be more than simply becoming aware through personal recollection what contributed to one’s self image. The problem with that “e” (“emergent”) word is that it simply means the other “e” (“evolution”). It is preferable to think in terms of the “formation” (a more functional word than “emerging”) of individual human consciousness if done independently of the democratic collective consensus. It is not healthy to think in conclusive terms in the use of those “e” words. The “e” words would be inadequate in Jaspers’ psychopathology where the word “Anlage” signifies the first recognizable commencement of an unhealthy development, which eventually points to a more indeterminate than determinable foundation for the aberration from normality. “Anlage” applies to 10-96 as a commencement of a new significant development.

2. But these “origin” forces  going-foul are not new and can be more or less found in melting pots at Glasgow and Oxford—At least if one is inclined to my way of thinking it can be found if sought for hard enough. Alan Olson has entered the fray in two sources: In Gregory Walter’s “Conversion” book Alan is quoted as referring to Jaspers’ “harangue” against the Catholic Church, and classifies as “infamous” (which can mean interference with civil rights or mean just plain wicked) that Catholic’s Concordat  (of Pius XII) with Hitler (ft. nt. 34, pa 224) and in a recent “Existenz” posting he manifests an awareness of the occidental forces in depicting Jaspers’ background as being North German Protestant, and Heidegger’s background as being “south German Swabian, Roman Catholic” (p. 3 Vol. 2, Nos1-2, Fall 2007, Jesus…). That north and south polarity (protestant v. Anglican/Catholic) can also be found in New England and New Spain and the New World in general. And I am looking for signs of it in England (i.e. the north and south). In Michigan North is anything north of Clare where during hunting season a 30-30 can be used, and south is where a 22 caliber or shotgun is legal, but the 30-30 legal in Upper Michigan, but not all of Lower Michigan.

2.1. Glasgow v. Oxford--These forces can also be found in England, or Great Britain as the case may be, through the north and through the south. Glasgow University is significantly the fourth oldest of the English-speaking world and one of the largest in Europe—that being significant because that University was King James II’s effort to compete (I’d like to think) Scottish academic forces with that of Oxford--the latter being the oldest in the English speaking world. He managed to get a paper and stick, i.e. he got a “papal” bull for that purpose (1454). If the bull was to ward off the British reformation it backfired (John Knox possibly at Glasgow 1522) in Scotland. The Scottish reformation resulted in the mace and bull being hustled to France by the fleeing Marian Archbishop. The mace’s return was a reminder that it was to be used to beat off reformationists, but the document (bull) was not returned (wikipedia) which meant sheepskins could not be authenticated by bull (which might have made for greater academic freedom)—at least that is my correctible interpretation.

3. Alexander Campbell, Glasgow alumnus--He was educated at Glasgow before coming to America in @1810 (09). In Glasgow he excelled in logic. In America he debated Catholic Bishop Purcell, with Campbell standing for the spirit of inquiry being produced by the Protestant Reformation and contributing to the moral culture, and Purcell saying the Reformation was the cause of all the infidelity in the world. The Catholic Purcell had attempted to have the bible removed from public schools’ curriculum. Campbell’s position, comparable to Jaspers’, was that biblical traditions should be taught but without purposive action (See Gregory p. 167, and FM p 315) and Jaspers saw such teaching, amidst forces, as providing “youth with an orientation about total rule” (p.314). Purcell of course was concerned that the Bible in the curriculum might mean a loss of membership.  Campbell was familiar with the Scottish Enlightenment, and with John Locke (=the impossibility that a cogitative being should spring from an incogitative its cause). He, Campbell, was a significant Glasgow educated personage due in part to his carrying on the reformation in the New World. The reformation within the first 12 years had a membership that reached 100,000 almost seven times that of the Presbyterians’ annual average over 190 years (p. 21, Christian Preacher, 1837, a dependable account due to the newness of the group). It is significant too because it was a force changing quickly over time, something to be reckoned with as shown by the Owens-Campbell, and Purcell-Campbell debate and others. Established institutions prefer slight changes over time so predictions can be made and the pace of change accommodated to the institution.

3.1. EXCURSION: (The establishment known as The Disciples of Christ lay exclusive claim to the spirit of these Glasgow entities, Thomas and Alexander Campbell, doing so because the Disciples have a centralized headquarters that needs a genetic connection.  But the Disciples of Christ organization is so institutionally systematic that it be infiltrated, as did Jim Jones by complying with the convention-approved ordination process. The Disciples’ Website lists two groups as splinters from the “Disciples” establishment. The group that is listed as Christian Churches in reality includes those churches that most frequently appear as “Church of Christ” and sometimes as “Christian Church”, and some of those do not have headquarters, rather the churches are independent and locally autonomous, but there are schools of higher education that distinguish and identify the group as being non-denominational. The Disciples have been known to instigate litigation against the independents’ democratic and republic efforts to withdraw from financing through the headquarters. The Disciples nurture catholicity but use ecumenical language. With care one might find in these independent groups the small sects Jaspers speaks of when saying in them there is a hope for the church invisible. There are some “Community Churches too that would qualify at least some of the time but the main standard is that the hope of the church, according to Jaspers, is the Biblical faith. Enough…)

4. Glasgow associates materializing: Peter J. Bussey, Ramona Fotiade, Chris Thornhill, and 19th century’s Thomas and Alexander Campbell—These are Glasgow associates. We know the first two through manipulations relative to Herbert Müller’s blog (which he names after Karl Jaspers). Peter participated in the blog while avoiding references to Jaspers’ views (UD 8)  Ramona shows up too on Herbert’s blog without any direct reference to Jaspers (see  item 2. etc. of UD 15) and more at

4.1. Chris is known through the KJSNA where it was noted that he’d made the contribution to the Stanford Encyclopedia, and through Boston University’s Existenz Webpage. As said above, Thomas and his son Alexander Campbell can be grouped here because educated at the University of Glasgow. The possibility and the actual extent of the influence of Glasgow to the reformation in the New World is more than intriguing. So, my paper here includes some wondering as to how much the University of Glasgow contributed to the mission in the New World, at first carrying on, in America, the work of the reformation in Scotland and then the movement known as the restoration movement when to them the bible became the only church rule of faith and practice rather than any Vatican or Presbyterian disciplinary procedure. Why these Glasgow personages should suddenly appear out of the cybersphere seems almost by somebody’s think-tank design.  

5. New York University’s William Barrett, Hugh Kelly, and John Draper (following the school trail)--But there’s more to be said about that abnormal causal connection with Heidegger. Barrett prefers to see Heidegger, (like as Hugh Kelly seems to have preferences for Augustine and Aquinas--also associated with the same school), with a radical preference to the point of Heideggerism: “Heidegger seeks only to be a thinker; and as such, he towers above men like Jaspers and Buber: to put it in blunt American, as thinkers they are not even in the same league with Heidegger” (p 236 Irrational Man). Barrett sees Heidegger as the worthy channel through which Kierkegaard (remember he is claimed by Catholicism in part due to his rebellion with the state catholicism of the Denmark protestant national church—See item 8 below): Barrett sees Heidegger as the “new Kierkegaard to pump back living blood into the ontological skeleton of the Heideggerian Dasein.” (p.237)

5.1. Hugh Kelly (NY U) stops short of such Heideggerism thanks to Hannah Arendt (who could be easily misunderstood when referring to Jaspers as more spatial than the more temporal Heidegger). The comparison is appropriate when interpreted in terms of the Western grasp of the limits of reason and the resultant need for a standard to avoid temporal forces moving into the spatial voids—due to the separation clause). Whether there are rationalism forces behind this association with Jaspers through Arendt is something that a detailed biography from Hugh might tend to illuminate—if one can avoid the paranoia engendered by strong religio-political-academic processes under momentum. The circumstances if largely indeterminable could amount to a manifest-philosophical destiny: like, “It is a question of philosophical destiny whether or not in my youth I entrust myself to the study of a great philosopher and to which of the great philosophers I entrust myself” (Wisdom 192). In my case philosophical destiny includes such phenomena as being in the philosophical isle of the library when professor Drake came by and whispered no disapproval of Jaspers’ The Perennial Scope of Philosophy” that I was reviewing (, or see “my bio”). Design to is involved for there is good reason why the book was in library—probably due to Drake’s recommendation, though Chardin’s books were in the library too.

5.2. John W. Draper, New York University—See my “site map” and Dawkins First Continuum, 6.6ff . I want to only add here that he was home schooled much of his early years. He played a major but by design a minimized role in the Oxford debate involving Wilberforce and Huxley. My main point here is to draw attention to the sudden standing-out of Glasgow and New York University.

6. Neither Hegel or Heidegger “I-influenced” Jaspers (in the sense of “D-day”)--Without turning this internet freeway into something pivoting around Hegel, whose dialectical forms contributed to the reformation spirit and mind’s reaction to vatic authority, and was used and restricted to naturalism in the Oxford-Dawkins sense, it is important to realize that Jaspers was aware that the genius of Hegel should not be allowed to relapse into a narrow pseudo-knowledge. This observation is seen due to the current tendency toward raison d’étre, that when confronted with reason’s limits, there should occur an escape or repose into a prosaic state where some meaningful verbiage becomes indicative of the human being as a whole. So much for the preference for Hegel’s influence on Jaspers, and the forced connection with the dialectical idealism of Hegel and subsequently with the dialectical materialism of Darwin (The Oxford worm hole to Paris where all roads lead you-know-where--and Henry II’s Glasgow as the basin for the reformation flowing through Scotland).

7. Chris Thornhill’s “originary”—The Stanford Encyclopedia piece on Karl Jaspers is the concentration point of this Web page. He uses the symbol “originary” to describe Jaspers’ Existenz philosophy and philosophical logic, whereas I make use of the phrase “origin-sin” to point at Jaspers’ awareness that humankind’s origin cannot be known and to think otherwise is to err. It is not to be confused with the doctrine known as original sin as something inherited. Chris’ idea seems more positive in that it points to the constant in humankind that equals whatever pluses that make humankind incomparably and indeterminably unique—at least that is what I think he means giving him the benefit of Existenz trust. But he is more incorrect than correct when saying that later in life Jaspers deemphasized Existenz. I find the concept and word used often enough in Philosophical Faith and Revelation. If there is a change in frequency it can well be due to the misuse others made of the word (I mean Heidegger used it too).

7.1. “Origin-Sin”--My hyphenated word is a double negative in the sense that it points disparagingly at the religious sanctity to which dialectical materialism has narrowed into pseudo-knowledge (“no matter how grand, and no matter what important points, true knowledge, and effective speculation it might contain” 281 PFR.)... And that is the possible problem with Chris’ “originary”; it tends to lean toward knowability rather than faith in humankind’s origin—what Jaspers prefers to associate with the Biblical faith and not with the “christian” religion which is capitalized by Catholicism. Origin-sin suggests that you can sinfully play with origins but be aware of the consequences for the beginning can become just as absolute as the teleology inherent in the subsequent logic. Playing with Origin-sin means no recourse to sacrifice but a certain fearful looking forward to judgment.

There is a point to such arguments, but only so long as genetic and paleontological research proceeds ad infinitum. They lead us astray if they are meant as speculative statements on the origin of life, on the premise that certain theses exhaust the possibilities and must not conflict with each other. What we must keep in mind here is the essence of our cognition of the world: to proceed endlessly without being able to grasp the one and the whole. Philosophically, this basic fact points beyond the world and will not let us see the absolute in a cognoscible world. (PFR 175)
7.2. A. Campbell’s “St. Origin” slip-up, the challenge to Rome—Genetic errancy has led to the relevancy this other Glasgow personage, Alexander Campbell  (see 8.12 below). On page 7 of Campbell’s first discourse:
…here lies the true philosophy of the intimate union and indissoluble connexion [sic] between the Bible,  science, truly and properly so called; not the science of the creations of human fancy such as that of the Gnostics—the Metaphysicians, and the Theologians, of the order of Saint Origin [sic], Saint Augustine, or Saint Pelagius; but the science, or the knowledge of nature—the creation of God, acquired by the application of our minds to his works, as displayed in the heavens and in the earth, in the land and in the sea, in the length and breadth of the mineral and vegetable, and animal kingdoms of nature. This is the science which interprets the Bible, and therefore, the more profoundly we understand the one, the more highly must we appreciate the other.*
I am spinning off Campbell’s psychic-connections, the route taken by his ideas about objective origin and subjective origins, about creation in the subjective and objective sense, and what might be a mere spelling error that both Campbell and the Editor missed. At any rate “Saint Origin” is easy to spin off perchance if it was an Existenz type of slip. I’m taking the liberty of assuming the incorrectness (according to today’s spelling) to be an inspired error made the best of. This paragraph received a lot of focus for there was something about it that Campbell felt needed further clarification—but he left “Saint Origin” alone as though what was written was written. Furthermore he was wholly into the “origin” frame of referential thinking and believing.
7.3. In his footnote Campbell in detail describes knowledge as like two chapters in a book, one the real and the other the imaginative, one means the creations of God and the other the purely mental creations of man. Now this is 1836 and Campbell is challenging catholicity’s centralization in Rome or any central place in space. He was more spatial than temporal regarding origin thinking. It is in this book that Campbell and the Editor write: Editor, “We ask again ‘who will try’ to sustain the claims of the Pope and Popery?” (p.95). Campbell’s challenge is directed to the Pope or any Bishop under his jurisdiction in the old world or the new, and includes that the contest use both the scripture and logic, by tongue or pen.

7.4. The sudden growth of the Church of Christ by dissenters from the Scottish Church in the New World had to have been alarming to Catholicism’s mission in America. The larger point is the problem that this Glasgow graduate posed by preaching the Bible standard. My point is that the Oxford Draper/Huxley/Wilberforce debate was, in the background, more about avoiding doing irreparable damage to the vatic standard than about science. In the book “The Christian Preacher” the preacher demonstrated a mastery of science including “all the facts which Natural History, and Natural Philosophy have opened to our view; all of which go to the demonstration of his existence and perfection” (ft. nt. p.7). Campbell’s debating skills would have to be defeated sidewinder style by whispering undercover Primates that had gained access to academia, to Oxford—tactics tried and honed by the experiences learned during the inquisition.

7.5. The dialectical thesis, antithesis, and synthesis of the three “origins”-- So one can wonder to what degree “originary” and “origin-sin” is to be distinguished from one another and from “Saint Origin”. Jaspers, in the introduction to “The Origin and Goal of History”, affirms that his “outline is based on an article of faith: that mankind has one single origin and one goal. Origin and goal are unknown to us, utterly unknown by any kind of knowledge…All men [sic] are related in Adam, originate from the hand of God and are created after His image.” (xv)
7.6. The sudden burst, origin, of Glasgow personages are not miraculous apparitions, but open to investigation with some knowledge of forces vying for position in the battle for the souls. 

8. The significance and suggestibility of Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s influence on Jaspers in Stanford piece—There’s no doubt that Kierkegaard’s response to the State Church of Denmark was psycho-socio-religio-logically noteworthy to Jaspers. But we should not be deluded, for what was of notoriety was Kierkegaard’s reaction to the catholicity of the Denmark Church, or that sort of Catholic Lutherism. He of course rebelled against priests being paid from the public coffer and married priests too not because he was a committed Thomist but because it pointed out the ridiculousness of supporting the priesthood by public funds. This is mentioned because there is a Catholicity ebb and flow to stake Catholic claims on anything that moves including Kierkegaard. One does not have to be a ranting bigot to find that, but one must be willing to risk pointing at it because it is there. The “priest” Walter Lowrie stakes such a claim so vividly in his introduction to “Kierkegaard’s Attack Upon ‘Christendom’”. Lowrie’s Anglican Catholicism and Episcopalism effort to bring all to the communion of the Roman Church is obvious—that ecumenical spirit gone bad and crystallized. Lowrie is resolute in the effort to make Kierkegaard a Catholic “priest” rather than a small (p)protestant. If such propaganda should be successful the issue of accountability is compounded when Jaspers is said to be unduly influenced by Kierkegaard, for Jaspers would not want to be indirectly connected with vatic revelational authority.

8.1. Why Kierkegaard became popular and why Jaspers had to evaluate--Kierkegaard is renown because he was a prophetic mover in what is mistaken as a consequence of the protestant reformation, i.e., the Denmark Church. But his attack upon Christendom was, in the words of Lowrie, “historically…one of the most prominent examples of popular diatribe” and that included those not friendly to what Lowrie meant by “Church”. Lowrie prefers to find Kierkegaard’s diatribes not against the “Church” but Christendom (xiv), and prefers that “priests” be “paid by the State” xv. –referring to the free Churches in America (unimaginable!). And in the next paragraph “I too am a ‘priest’” and he expresses the revealing preference that if Kierkegaard had lived longer he would have become a Catholic. That sort of tactic by Catholicity is what Jaspers was well aware of and why it is necessary to see the influence of Kierkegaard on Jaspers from a cautious perspective and not from the perspective of the “evolving” Catholic Church and its possessive tactics, i.e., adaptation means owning Kierkegaard if not suddenly then through small increments over long time.  For Jaspers the faith Kierkegaard reflects is the constant, i.e., “a primal awareness of being through the mediation of history and thought” (p.10 Perennial) and philosophical faith does not begin from nothing but goes back to the primal source involved in “Why do you believe?—Because my father told me” was Kierkegaard’s answer; and for Jaspers: “this answer…applies also to philosophy” (p.20). Evaluating Kierkegaard correctly goes to philosophical faith not vatic faith.

8.2. Jaspers realized the significance of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche around 1913, 1914, 1915 and 1919—Chris writes that Jaspers converted to philosophy in the early 20’s. That puts it too close for comfort to his acquaintance with Heidegger whom he met first 4-10-21 (Kirkbright). Unfortunately care should be taken to avoid the idea that Jaspers’ philosophical inclinations began with Heidegger—as though a special awareness came by way of Heidegger (a Catholic).  His first mention of Kierkegaard in his textbook on Gen. Psych. can be dated by a footnote on page 315 in which he is referring to his 1935 book Psychology of Worldviews. That means he became very much conscious of how the forces would be vying for possession of two controversial and popular philosophers and psychologists, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. But there’s more…

8.3. Jaspers’ lectures alerted the forces--The fact that he included K and N in his seminar lectures in 1918, and was studying Hegel and Nietzsche in 1915 (Kirkbright p. 112) means the attention he gave them was like an alarm to religious establishments. His 1913 (Anderson’s Forward p.v., Gen. P) textbook was updated several times so it is hard to know the time of his reference (p. 776) regarding Heidegger’s use of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, but it could be too convenient a reason for Jaspers to look at them from the Heidegger-forces perspective. The reference most likely shows an urgency intensified by a need to protect the freedom of philosophical thinking. In Lib. Liv. p. 26 Jaspers seems to be saying that he began studying Kierkegaard in 1914. Again, he met Heidegger in 4-10-21. These were two personages that would appeal to Jaspers’ psychopathology and it is understandable that he would first use Kierkegaard in “Meaningful Connections” and the 1935 ft. nt., then in “Biography”, then in the section on “religion and the psyche”, and then “Human as a Whole”. Heidegger’s critique of Hegel (Tübingen), though showing the useful advantage of researching Hegel, the fact that Hegel was professor of philosophy at Heidelberg, and then University of Berlin, that along with the school-rivalry, was enough for a Jaspers’ commonsense understanding that they were of academic worth. Christ sees this too, that, due to Heidegger’s alignment with the National Socialism forces (and I would say the “papal” intervention which sent a shock wave through Jaspers) it led Jaspers to concentrate on the role of religious forces, or as Chris said, it led to “concentrating on elaborating the interior or religious aspects of his philosophy”.  Chris is less than more right when seeking even a slight family connection between Jaspers and Heidegger. I don’t think Heidegger should be listed as a “fourth” influence, nor for that matter should Arendt be so listed along with Kant and Weber. I doubt if a “role reversal” actually occurred, as Chris indicates, other than she was in America teaching at the New School, and the Jaspers still needed friends and personages recommending his books. She was “the child Hannah” (Kirkbright) to the Jaspers and a friend in time of great need.

8.4. Chris’ “evolution” paragraph regarding Habermas to Joseph Ratzinger—The Habermas connection with Jaspers is that they had both been at Heidelberg. It is a stretch to get from Jaspers to the European Union and to the Catholic tactical foresight that Ratzinger had to position early for EU claims. (though not indicated in Chris’ piece, elsewhere there might be some pop-politics involved here too to fit Foucault in there somewhere).

8.5. Kierkegaard and Campbell, different situations—In 1836 Kierkegaard was in his early twenties when the reformation in the New World was on the move. There were not the restraints here due to the separation clause (though Joseph Smith, Mormon, probably saw the ratification of the clause as a threat because it left room for foreign religious and internal intervention--and Campbell went to NY to debate him but it never materialized). Campbell was free to speak against Catholicity and catholicity in any form and he did so against titles like the National Preacher, the Baptist Preacher, the Presbyterian Preacher, the Methodist Preacher, “and others of the political and sectarian cast.” In difference Campbell contributed to a new 1836 monthly publication known as the “Christian Preacher” (referred to above). Unlike the restraints Kierkegaard imposed upon himself as a prophet within the State’s Church, Campbell could speak of “Christian” for two reasons that Kierkegaard could not: The first was that the reformation here did not have the State Church to compete with, and second, the Reformation had morphed into the restoration of the standard (bible) needed for the times at the grass roots level free from civil and religious legislative restraints (while Mormonism was adding to the standard a peculiarly Western-Hemisphere history with the aid of the miracle of the Angel Gabriel as though competing with the Mexico, New Spain, Catholic Marian apparition of the 16th century).

8.6. Hegel’s dialectical idea-ism and the easy slip into dialectical materialism is not something Jaspers slipped up on—Hegel and Kant took liberties with the intellect’s liberation from the thought-control centered in Rome. George Park Fisher (Yale) understood Hegel’s epistemology correctly, that dialectical idealism, was an ism or ontologism that could morph at critical state when institutionalism could use it and blame the metamorphosis on the protestant Kant and Hegel. “Hegel professed to set forth the process in which the entire universe evolved, and necessarily evolved.” “The philosophical view is the last stage in the development of consciousness” (Fisher, Hist. Doct. p 532, 7th.impression 1949, first 1896) and this Hegelian law followed the groove of least resistance in the view that Jesus was one man conscious of being at one with God, and the fourth gospel becomes late due to the necessity for the new thesis to fit the thesis-antithesis-synthesis law. This slip into dialectical materialism is not Jaspers’ view as Chris has correctly shown while referring to the Myth debate. Furthermore, if it were not for the semiotics of the word “evolution”, the idealistic dialectic of Hegel could still be a protestant product. It was Darwin’s simple superimposing of the dialectic-logic over empirical differentiations and infinite comparisons that was the last straw that broke the value of the dialectical reasoning process, and the person of Jesus (in terms of what forces did to make one suffer the crucifixion) no longer believed to be the center of history. Over Jaspers’ objections, humankind becomes one species comparable with species, measurable material, the origin of which is understood in dialectical material ways (Perennial, @55). And this is where Hegel’s protestant faith restored itself in the statement that Arandt includes in The Lib. of Liv. Phil.: “Hegel on his death bed said no one understood him.” And that was and is true with Jaspers, for to inadequately understand Hegel is to slip into the materialism of pop-academia. From the individual perspective, for Jaspers, the sublimation in the synthesis and new thesis involves God’s impetus not from the material, i.e., matter (except if periechontology is understood). For Hegelianism it is more a sublate process where one thesis is canceled but something preserved and then elevated. For Jaspers the sublime is constant and systematically the limits of reason and emotion are demonstrable. So, it should not be assumed that Jaspers is a dialectical cog in the flywheel of Hegelian law, but rather the monkey wrench that stops the process short of meaningless psychic connections used as ammunition in the abnormal struggle for the psyche in society and history.     

9. Appendix—A. Campbell’s thoughts referred to above can be found in book printed by James and Gazlay in 1836 (Cincinnati, Ohio)—It was passed on to me by my father, and it, “The Christian Preacher” edited by D.S. Burnett, now fragile lays carefully open to the page containing the editor’s Preface and A. Campbell’s Dec. 18th 1835 letter accompanying the first Monthly publication for January 1836 and printed in book form at the end of 1836.
9.1. The editor displays the attitude prevalent at the time in the minds of the new world reformationists and the minds of those in what would become known as the restoration movement. Burnett, the editor, describes the divisiveness of sectarian casts, and speaks briefly about cultivating a suitable field (paideia like effort) to nurture talents needed beyond the casts, minds alert to the reality that
…every thing stagnates in quietude: the mutation of nature is eternal. Not an orb stands still, nor an atom remains unchanged in its relations or its substance. It is in this variety and eternity of motion that the phenomena of existence, life and reason, are elicited, and it is the province of man, by the law of nature, to contemplate and profit by them all, by gathering and controlling the momentum of every impulse. His fortune is in unfurling his sail to the breeze, and in riding upon the wave-top of the ocean of life. Activity is the law of mind, and well directed activity constitutes its safety.” (iii, iv)
Immediately following this editorial’s opening statement is A. Campbell’s first letter in which he continues the sea-of-life analogy, with an affection similar to Jaspers to his close-nit family, but congeniality is given its place in this statement: “I am always more willing to endorse for the matter, than the manner; and I trust the discourse will be found to contain good and wholesome doctrine.” The topic of his discourse was “The Riches of Christ”. The sermon, Campbell says, could be delivered by some of the brotherhood in the Western Reserve to the brotherhood in one hour or less. The sermon shows the depth of both the preacher and the potential believed of the audience.

10. Corrections and apologies…if and as needed


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