THE “KARL JASPERS FORUM”, UPDATE 17 (4-1-2006)
FOR QUICK REFERENCE:
1. Herbert avoids historical reality by naught “0” bubbles
1.3. Historical example of naught thinking—David Hume and a Scottish movement
2. Sid Barnett’s Radical Constructivism resurgence
3.David Hume as cypher of meaning and the Vanity Press
1. Herbert avoids Complicated Historical analysis--This week (4-1-2006) Herbert informs Mr. Rodrigo Barros Gewehr that his, Herbert’s, presentations are to be viewed as primarily epistemological rather than from “the ethical point”. What Herbert is under compulsion to do here is place an absolute barrier between traditional values and his constructionism’s (radical constructivism) formulae. Herbert uses the word epistemology to imply that he has reduced truth standards to a system that because systematic it must be yielded to as science. In effect it is a complex tool to escape real situations, i.e., to avoid the complicated relativity of complex reality. It is a system encompassed by a know-it-all metaphysic. Herbert’s superficial epistemological system is modifiable more by the word ideal rather than the word real. Epistemological idealism has at least ten modifications and realistic epistemology has at least a dozen when subjected to detailed analysis (such as the study done by Celestine N. Bittle in Reality and the Mind). It is further complicated by a variety of categorizations depending on whether for some special or general frame of reference one comes down on the real-ideal or the ideal-real side of the bounding bouncing epistemological…bubble. Rather than deal with difficult to predict reality, a “naught” placard is constructed. It is a placard built from discarded reality, but physical, i.e., empirical in so far as the placard is real enough to warrant attention.
1.2. Naught thinking--It is metaphysic because one must assume the system of handling reality is empirically based. The reality though is that the empirical base is limitless and uncomfortably structured so Herbert’s window of escape from complex history--or whatever is to be avoided--is the discriminate application of naught thinking. He has a formula symbol for this, which he repeats this week as though it is something he has fully established. It must not be often repeated for repetition is depended upon as a teaching method, and repeated oft enough it becomes a nil motto. Instead I use “naught”. Naught thinking is protesting thinking. Everybody does it and normalcy depends on how empirically real, historically grounded ones’ ideas are evaluated, and done so without too quick a retreat into naught thinking as an established epistemology.
1.3. A Historical Example Showing Naught thinking—Below is a slightly revised excerpt taken from my TA53C2 posted on Herbert’s Website Sept. 18, 2002. It is used to show naught thinking in an aberrant performance role, and also its use in a proper role. It is also used to relate this UPDATE to Sid Barnett’s Comment this week. It tends to show Hume is applying appropriately naught-thinking to alleged miracles, but then cantilevers off Jesuit constructivism and carries naught-thinking into theistic tradition. Naught thinking is then applied to both misuses of critical thinking, but then traditional theistic thinking nullifies naught-thinking just this side of nihilism and radical constructivism. The excerpt is from a Comment to Herbert and relative to J.Johnson’s quantum evolutionism.
Here we see vactic-authority compared to a reasonable Scottish movement respecting miracles, which emphasized the book as standard rather than the Church of Rome or High Church of England. The English Church’s phenomenological-critiquing of empirical culture could not compete with the hallucinating-eidetic prone culture of Romanism. The naught-thinking rationalism of Herbert’s symbols is by comparison an irresponsible avoidance of historical complexes and obviously easier than risking confrontation with the vatic conditioning of his upbringing. Jaspers’ General Psychopathology and his Philosophical Faith and Revelation are applicable to aberrant naught thinking. Both works are complex but empirically based and naught-critical thinking is not escaped through a rationalized short-circuiting epistemologoism.
2. Sid Barnett’s radical constructivism—Sid to my knowledge has never referred to Jaspers. This seems to qualify him for summoning back to the service of Herbert’s Website. Herbert’s references to others (collective), though still shady, such as “individual-and-collective subjective bubble” is a slender sign of movement toward realistic objective thinking. Sid picks up on this. The verbiage manifests a continued but confusing coming-to-terms that are more accommodating to a balanced real/ideal epistemology. Jaspers’ encompassings remains far removed from the immanental boundary that comes from blowing self-inflated bubbles. Though the bubble-boundary is illusory to normal traditional critical thinking, it only exists as a radical construction and with a stretch of the imagination can be considered empirical. The image Herbert is using is a modification of a naught-bubble, that is, a compromised use of his usual formula (I repeat here only with caveat “0 D”). To bubble making specialists bubbles can be made within, partially within, and without etc. And there is certain osmosis effect and or affect depending on pressure from within and without. The specialized bubble maker has escaped self imagined bubbles that range in various sizes in the spectrum from withdrawal on one end and on the other end overbearing presence, and the medium areas ranging from inferiority to superiority feelings and corresponding constructivisms. Sid appears to be challenging the conscientiousness of Herbert’s radical constructivism, and affirming his own radical constructivism stance such as when he says: “The subjective bubble that I am familiar with contains only one subject, me”. Sid could be struggling for position within the Constructivism community.
2.2. Sid does not get Herbert’s endorsement—The first time Sid contributed to Herbert’s Website was through Herbert’s TA57. Sid’s publisher had, according to Herbert, sent a prepublication copy of Sid’s book to get his opinion. The suggestion is that the opinion would be valued. The first question I had at the time was why would a publisher send a copy of an author’s book to Herbert for an “opinion”. I can’t conceive of that happening unless it was Sid’s idea. A hint as to this being Sid’s effort to gain publicity is to be found in one of his Comments where he seemed disillusioned and stated that he was under the impression that he and Herbert were in agreement. In other words he thought that Herbert would approve the book. To maintain his image of superior opining, Herbert had to find something to criticize, and it was found, perhaps, in the author’s failings at attributing anything to Herbert or his formulae, and perhaps not referencing Glasersfeld’s radical constructivism. But there’s another reason:
2.3. Sid’s unfortunate anonym--Another reason Herbert would not do more than use the occasion to foster his own epistemological subjectivism is that the author used an anonym to hide behind or to use in some fashion, gaining notice by mere association. Either way it amounted to standing behind someone else. And the name chosen was a personage known as an empiricist, and an empiricist, David Hume, who dared be critical of Jesuits. Maybe Sid has not yet grasped the significance of the dynamics of the real world that is denied but used by Herbert’s epistemological idealism and its vatic reality connection. Both Sid and Herbert are so wrapped up in limiting truth-value to subjective states that the real world of complexity is avoided and replaced by a confused unstructured immanental world of subjectivism. Someone else’s name used as the author of the book was all the suggestion Herbert needed to accuse Sid of being in subjection to something given to him from reality. Herbert does similarly, and even more intensely, like in the use of Jaspers’ name, the Vatican; and the hypocrisy is made glaring by Sid’s participation in the constantly short-circuited discussion, though that was not Sid’s subtle intention—I guess.
2.4. A quick review of the Sid-Herbert forum stuff—A review of the Comments and Responses between Sid and Herbert confirm some intense verbalizations. One of Herbert’s Responses refers to a C24 by Sid, and that C24 cannot be found. Then in one of Sid’s Comments, at the conclusion, Herbert reverts to the editorial notation, a tactic Herbert uses if he does not want further discussion. Needless to say the dialogue became a futile effort, and ended with Sid’s comment, “But I harbor the suspicion that a bit of MIR has stuck into your thinking.” Sid’s mistake from the beginning was using those symbols and falling victim to Herbert’s systemic rationalism. (And I apologize for using the formula symbols.) But Sid was right, but also guilty of feeling guilt about doing similarly. Currently, it is my guess that Sid senses conquest is nigh and it’s made possible by the distinction between experience and mind. Sid leans toward the experience bubble and Herbert the mind bubble of subjectivism.
2.5. Sid reenters to unravel the discombobulating subjectivism—Now with the return of D. K. Johnson’s critiquing of radical constructivism with a constructive realism, Sid rallies and returns again asking Herbert to clarify what he means by the part of the subjectivism bubble that is verbalized as “collective”. It seems Sid is making the argument that he qualifies more as a radical empirical subjectivist than Herbert, and is emboldened by D.K. Johnson’s constructivist realism. What we must not lose sight of in this glossolalia exchange is that great pains are being taken to eliminate objective standards of behavior which do not need a vatic’s authority to rule on what is miraculous enough to be considered standard for sainthood. If Herbert and Sid do not know what they are doing they could at least wonder if their unwitting wits are being used by totalitarians.
3. An Extract from Herbert’s Website—Below is my reaction to the conversation from and to nowhere (glossolalia for there are no interpreters) as posted on Herbert’s Website July 8, 2003 (TA57C18). I’ve made a few changes but mainly minor corrections, and changed the title. It is included to show that tap-dancing first on the experience and then the mind side of a spinning epistemological subjectivism’s pinhead gets nowhere beyond verbal aesthetics. Herbert’s dance has a dizzying effect when he taps about toothaches, the pain of crucifixion, etc. that experiences are something irrelevant to epistemological truth, but relevant enough for him to say it all must be structured from the unstructured and there is no message being declared. My extract’s issue is the same as that which David Hume was addressing, that the use of miracles by collective or individual autonomous entities, co-ops, is an unbelievable miracle as such and has a stifling effect on the mysterious part of phenomenal occurrences. For example, a natural critic has a tendency to react rather than transact to unusual phenomena that is claimed and sanctified for some institutional or political purpose. It has to do with vanity phenomenology.