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Notation: This week Herbert’s Website includes his Comment to Mr. Barros, and a Comment from Sid Barnett. None make reference to Jaspers. None can find an appropriate connection with Jaspers.


1. Herbert avoids historical reality by naught  “0” bubbles

1.3. Historical example of naught thinking—David Hume and a Scottish movement

2. Sid Barnett’s Radical Constructivism resurgence

3.David Hume as cypher of meaning and the Vanity Press

1. Herbert avoids Complicated Historical analysis--This week (4-1-2006) Herbert informs Mr. Rodrigo Barros Gewehr that his, Herbert’s, presentations are to be viewed as primarily epistemological rather than from “the ethical point”. What Herbert is under compulsion to do here is place an absolute barrier between traditional values and his constructionism’s (radical constructivism) formulae. Herbert uses the word epistemology to imply that he has reduced truth standards to a system that because systematic it must be yielded to as science. In effect it is a complex tool to escape real situations, i.e., to avoid the complicated relativity of complex reality. It is a system encompassed by a know-it-all metaphysic. Herbert’s superficial epistemological system is modifiable more by the word ideal rather than the word real. Epistemological idealism has at least ten modifications and realistic epistemology has at least a dozen when subjected to detailed analysis (such as the study done by Celestine N. Bittle in Reality and the Mind). It is further complicated by a variety of categorizations depending on whether for some special or general frame of reference one comes down on the real-ideal or the ideal-real side of the bounding bouncing epistemological…bubble. Rather than deal with difficult to predict reality, a “naught” placard is constructed. It is a placard built from discarded reality, but physical, i.e., empirical in so far as the placard is real enough to warrant attention.

1.2. Naught thinking--It is metaphysic because one must assume the system of handling reality is empirically based. The reality though is that the empirical base is limitless and uncomfortably structured so Herbert’s window of escape from complex history--or whatever is to be avoided--is the discriminate application of naught thinking. He has a formula symbol for this, which he repeats this week as though it is something he has fully established. It must not be often repeated for repetition is depended upon as a teaching method, and repeated oft enough it becomes a nil motto. Instead I use “naught”. Naught thinking is protesting thinking. Everybody does it and normalcy depends on how empirically real, historically grounded ones’ ideas are evaluated, and done so without too quick a retreat into naught thinking as an established epistemology.

1.3. A Historical Example Showing Naught thinking—Below is a slightly revised excerpt taken from my TA53C2 posted on Herbert’s Website Sept. 18, 2002. It is used to show naught thinking in an aberrant performance role, and also its use in a proper role. It is also used to relate this UPDATE to Sid Barnett’s Comment this week. It tends to show Hume is applying appropriately naught-thinking to alleged miracles, but then cantilevers off Jesuit constructivism and carries naught-thinking into theistic tradition. Naught thinking is then applied to both misuses of critical thinking, but then traditional theistic thinking nullifies naught-thinking just this side of nihilism and radical constructivism. The excerpt is from a Comment to Herbert and relative to J.Johnson’s  quantum evolutionism.

Your attention is directed toward David Hume's critique and suspicions relative to so-called miracles based on some popular phenomena of his time. The historical precedent is as follows: He points to those alleged miracles at the tomb of the Abbé Paris confirmed supposedly by educated dignitaries and when seen as something to be exploited further was leaped upon by the supposedly most educated elite, the Jesuits. This is the... leaping ... that is more miraculous than the miracles as such Hume is observing. That sort of exploitation is easily carried over into traditional theistic thinking, which, he thinks, must also be suspect. That is why, after Hume and in part due to his published observations, that there began a movement out of Scotland for a standard, namely the Bible, which in effect said community miracles ought to be confined to the time-era of the Bible. It did not eliminate belief (especially personal trust in the imageless God) in miracles but confined them to some standard other than the exploitation by the recognized religious institutions. It's like applying zero-derivation regarding wayward miraculous thinking and seems most appropriate regarding the encoding of the infinite nature of an alleged quantum evolution. So, now, is the time for your zero-derivation formula.

Another writer I've not been given permission to quote (but I take the liberty here to interpret) has attempted to defend natural religion or theology by pointing out that Hume does not consider fairly the God of Theism, that God having the best ... portfolio. By portfolio I take it he means the bible and nature. I object to the subsuming God under an ism like “theism” and also suggesting God needs a portfolio. In my view that is the very God Hume is confronting rather than the God that needs no portfolio. A God-portfolio is something limited minds need, and limited minds do not conjure God because of our needs for competitive miracles. But it’s reasonable to need a biblical standard.

Here we see vactic-authority compared to a reasonable Scottish movement respecting miracles, which emphasized the book as standard rather than the Church of Rome or High Church of England. The English Church’s phenomenological-critiquing of empirical culture could not compete with the hallucinating-eidetic prone culture of Romanism. The naught-thinking rationalism of Herbert’s symbols is by comparison an irresponsible avoidance of historical complexes and obviously easier than risking confrontation with the vatic conditioning of his upbringing. Jaspers’ General Psychopathology and his Philosophical Faith and Revelation are applicable to aberrant naught thinking. Both works are complex but empirically based and naught-critical thinking is not escaped through a rationalized short-circuiting epistemologoism.

2. Sid Barnett’s radical constructivism—Sid to my knowledge has never referred to Jaspers. This seems to qualify him for summoning back to the service of Herbert’s Website. Herbert’s references to others (collective), though still shady, such as “individual-and-collective subjective bubble” is a slender sign of movement toward realistic objective thinking. Sid picks up on this. The verbiage manifests a continued but confusing coming-to-terms that are more accommodating to a balanced real/ideal epistemology. Jaspers’ encompassings remains far removed from the immanental boundary that comes from blowing self-inflated bubbles. Though the bubble-boundary is illusory to normal traditional critical thinking, it only exists as a radical construction and with a stretch of the imagination can be considered empirical. The image Herbert is using is a modification of a naught-bubble, that is, a compromised use of his usual formula (I repeat here only with caveat “0 D”). To bubble making specialists bubbles can be made within, partially within, and without etc. And there is certain osmosis effect and or affect depending on pressure from within and without. The specialized bubble maker has escaped self imagined bubbles that range in various sizes in the spectrum from withdrawal on one end and on the other end overbearing presence, and the medium areas ranging from inferiority to superiority feelings and corresponding constructivisms. Sid appears to be challenging the conscientiousness of Herbert’s radical constructivism, and affirming his own radical constructivism stance such as when he says: “The subjective bubble that I am familiar with contains only one subject, me”. Sid could be struggling for position within the Constructivism community.

2.2. Sid does not get Herbert’s endorsement—The first time Sid contributed to Herbert’s Website was through Herbert’s TA57. Sid’s publisher had, according to Herbert, sent a prepublication copy of Sid’s book to get his opinion. The suggestion is that the opinion would be valued. The first question I had at the time was why would a publisher send a copy of an author’s book to Herbert for an “opinion”. I can’t conceive of that happening unless it was Sid’s idea. A hint as to this being Sid’s effort to gain publicity is to be found in one of his Comments where he seemed disillusioned and stated that he was under the impression that he and Herbert were in agreement. In other words he thought that Herbert would approve the book. To maintain his image of superior opining, Herbert had to find something to criticize, and it was found, perhaps, in the author’s failings at attributing anything to Herbert or his formulae, and perhaps not referencing Glasersfeld’s radical constructivism. But there’s another reason:

2.3. Sid’s unfortunate anonym--Another reason Herbert would not do more than use the occasion to foster his own epistemological subjectivism is that the author used an anonym to hide behind or to use in some fashion, gaining notice by mere association. Either way it amounted to standing behind someone else. And the name chosen was a personage known as an empiricist, and an empiricist, David Hume, who dared be critical of Jesuits. Maybe Sid has not yet grasped the significance of the dynamics of the real world that is denied but used by Herbert’s epistemological idealism and its vatic reality connection. Both Sid and Herbert are so wrapped up in limiting truth-value to subjective states that the real world of complexity is avoided and replaced by a confused unstructured immanental world of subjectivism. Someone else’s name used as the author of the book was all the suggestion Herbert needed to accuse Sid of being in subjection to something given to him from reality. Herbert does similarly, and even more intensely, like in the use of Jaspers’ name, the Vatican; and the hypocrisy is made glaring by Sid’s participation in the constantly short-circuited discussion, though that was not Sid’s subtle intention—I guess.

2.4. A quick review of the Sid-Herbert forum stuff—A review of the Comments and Responses between Sid and Herbert confirm some intense verbalizations. One of Herbert’s Responses refers to a C24 by Sid, and that C24 cannot be found. Then in one of Sid’s Comments, at the conclusion, Herbert reverts to the editorial notation, a tactic Herbert uses if he does not want further discussion. Needless to say the dialogue became a futile effort, and ended with Sid’s comment, “But I harbor the suspicion that a bit of MIR has stuck into your thinking.” Sid’s mistake from the beginning was using those symbols and falling victim to Herbert’s systemic rationalism. (And I apologize for using the formula symbols.) But Sid was right, but also guilty of feeling guilt about doing similarly. Currently, it is my guess that Sid senses conquest is nigh and it’s made possible by the distinction between experience and mind. Sid leans toward the experience bubble and Herbert the mind bubble of subjectivism.

2.5. Sid reenters to unravel the discombobulating subjectivism—Now with the return of D. K. Johnson’s critiquing of radical constructivism with a constructive realism, Sid rallies and returns again asking Herbert to clarify what he means by the part of the subjectivism bubble that is verbalized as “collective”. It seems Sid is making the argument that he qualifies more as a radical empirical subjectivist than Herbert, and is emboldened by D.K. Johnson’s constructivist realism. What we must not lose sight of in this glossolalia exchange is that great pains are being taken to eliminate objective standards of behavior which do not need a vatic’s authority to rule on what is miraculous enough to be considered standard for sainthood. If Herbert and Sid do not know what they are doing they could at least wonder if their unwitting wits are being used by totalitarians.

3. An Extract from Herbert’s Website—Below is my reaction to the conversation from and to nowhere (glossolalia for there are no interpreters) as posted on Herbert’s Website July 8, 2003 (TA57C18). I’ve made a few changes but mainly minor corrections, and changed the title. It is included to show that tap-dancing first on the experience and then the mind side of a spinning epistemological subjectivism’s pinhead gets nowhere beyond verbal aesthetics. Herbert’s dance has a dizzying effect when he taps about toothaches, the pain of crucifixion, etc. that experiences are something irrelevant to epistemological truth, but relevant enough for him to say it all must be structured from the unstructured and there is no message being declared. My extract’s issue is the same as that which David Hume was addressing, that the use of miracles by collective or individual autonomous entities, co-ops, is an unbelievable miracle as such and has a stifling effect on the mysterious part of phenomenal occurrences. For example, a natural critic has a tendency to react rather than transact to unusual phenomena that is claimed and sanctified for some institutional or political purpose. It has to do with vanity phenomenology.


Karl Jaspers: "... I am a thorough going unprejudiced empiricist..." (With some of my off the cuff venting about mystery, miracles, and the vanity press -- regarding TA57R6).


How interesting this pseudonym "David Hume." Did the author or publisher give any reason for anonymity? Why would one disregard Hume's forthrightness and appear hidden behind his name? Does the publisher have a freedom of information policy or some obligation to historical accountability? How could a researcher, especially a psychiatric orientated reader (HM), seriously report on a fictitious -- without a case history -- author's ideas? Could the riddle of authorship be unfolded in the fact that Hume's The DialoguesConcerning Natural Religion was not published until decades after it was prepared and three years after his death? By what miracle did Hume survive extermination after writing the first Enquiry against miracles? Is this fear of extermination behind "David Hume?"


One conceivable reason for the mystery is that the author is situated in an institution, which permits the publication of a work only if the association between author and institution is avoided. Another reason might be that one has a low self esteem, feels inadequate due to some lack of title, experience, or maybe has been awarded an honorable Degree -- doesn't want to dishonor the hand that gave it -- but can afford to pay for publication. Perhaps the publisher was seeking dignity by association with the name of “Karl Jaspers” and McGill, a need to escape what could appear as vanity-press conduct. If one produced a work that could be sold to members of one's group there would be no need for anonymity. Vanity is possible, in the sense that if the reviews and sales are good, authorship can then be leaked. But anonymity and anonym use has precedent such as with Kierkegaard, and only the user could testify as to intent in for defense.


There's another possibility. It is to present any view but the correct Hume, as in an attempt to discredit the real Hume and the historical circumstances in which he wrote. If one wanted to discredit Karl Jaspers -- because he might be correctly comprehended and thereby a risk to a favored movement -- one might do a work, call it "Karl Jaspers" and misrepresent his views. It's not easy to get away with this though with someone as current and lucid as Jaspers.


I've not been quiet regarding my cynicism relative to the KJF; it's a radical cynicism based on the intensity of Karl Jaspers' cultural influence and the inadequacy of institutionalism in various forms, such as in institutional religion (including a trend toward a religion of or Church of “evolution”). I'd be equally suspicious of a criticism of Hume's empiricism by comparing him with an off-the-wall "David Hume" -- apparition. Considering the amount of displeasure Hume caused miracle-based religion, its reasonable to wonder about possible subtle influences leading to misusing his name. Such misuse could develop anytime with either Hume or Jaspers. If saints are pounced on and made Church Saints, then skeptics can be pounced on and misrepresented too. Heretics and saints would be punished and rewarded by the miraculous institution “evolving” as the Kingdom of God on earth. Such use of nobility or notoriety was referred to in TA51, i.e. the angelic apparition appearing to Joseph Smith and the anxiety surrounding the separation of Church and State. (An anxiety partially justified by the law to make no law, now being misinterpreted and established by the misuse of the separation of Church and State as seen now to mean protecting Church sex abusers from due process. Administrators and executioners of the civil law, prosecutors, are deciding not to pursue the prosecution of bishops and priests, using the separation of Church and State as the rationale, a rationale defended if the executioners of the law can refer or defer to a Church's recorded policy. I mean rather than prosecute, turn the matter over to the Church’s system.) I'm implying it's possible there's a mind-set behind the KJF idea, and that HM as an outstanding rationalist, is enough so to be pounced on and misused. Jaspers is a great disturber, as was Hume -- and those disturbed can react one way or another, and some ways are predictable.


On the surface it appears as a compliment that HM would be asked by this publisher to review the "David Hume" work. But it adds to the conceptual puzzle: Why would a publisher who is about to publish a book ask for an objective review of it from HM? Did the author, in collusion with the Publisher, predict that HM would bash one Hume explicitly and implicitly the real historic empirical Hume? Deceptive anonym use can lead to paranoia.


There's an implication here that a criticism of the pseudonymous work is an effective off-the-wall criticism of the real Hume. After all let's not forget Hume was critical of the principles upon which Catholicity stood -- miracles conjured and exploited -- and remains the foundation. Though I don't have the advantage of the prepublication work, I would say that though HM's critique may be valid, it may not fairly apply to David Hume and John Locke, for they were using experience not far removed from a dominating culture conducive to apparitions, and what could not be overlooked was the reality of the imposing force of the Church and the subjective responsibility of handling that part of experience. After all, when Hume postpones till death the publication of some work, and "David Hume" fears the use of his name, this has to be an objective awareness of an objectivity that is real enough.... real enough and prestructured enough to be destructured and restructured for some purposes, not excluding possible aggrandizement.


In TA39C47 there's an exchange between Rifat and myself. He was puzzling over the "mystery" of apparitions. I asked if it did not seem strange that these miracles were witnessed in some cultures and not in others. The cultural shift, I indicated, was manifested in the paradigm of an incarnation of the virgin in the “virgin queen” of England. It inclined a culture toward empiricism, not miracles. The cultural trend discouraged seeing that which distracts from an autonomous English State declaring its independence from the continental Church and from the strength of its traditions. Though seeming to seriously struggle with this puzzle, Rifat seemed uneasy with applying a common sense critical thought process to the situation. The miracle of a Catholic ontology could not be shed -- but disturbed. It was engrained culturally and not subjected to serious doubt, though for Rifat it had been ... refined... so-to-say, into a "hierarchy of consciousness."


It would seem to me that HM's guarded criticism could more easily apply to such views as expressed by the authors of TA53, TA55, and TA60 (Is "Grandpierre" a pseudonym for a secular saint or an apparition required for a religion of evolution?). Where do these case-views fit in a general psychopathology? They fit in a chapter on apparitions, as case examples of aberrations from empirically grounded general consciousness. Here is where "Abstract Theory and abstraction ladder" could be placed, and visions of seeing thinking and remembering Amoebae too, as well as Grandpierre's fundamental ontology phrased as instincts and basic principles, the world of instincts and pre human consciousness (not to omit the hierarchy of consciousness mentioned above). Their phenomenologisms, fundamentalisms, ontologisms could be included in the section on Abnormal Psychic Phenomena in Jaspers' textbook General Psychopathology.


Those abnormal psychic phenomena elevated to principles could then be found in that first section of five introduced with Jaspers comment that "In the first five parts I hope I am a thorough going empiricist and that I am successful in my fight against platitudinous speculation, dogmatic theorizing and absolutism in every form." (p. 46, university of Chicago Press, The University of Toronto Press, English translation 1963.) Perhaps it's the place also for pseudo "David Hume" and all the data so far said about it.

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