

AN EXERCISE: A PARTIAL CONCEPT INDEX (Applying Jaspers' works)

Introduction: Regarding the lighthouse cover—Preferably, encompassing reason is the better part of humankind's history. Reason is taken to refer to the openness of the infinite relativity of the swirling cognizing spectrum, and its nemesis is rationalism, the closed ends of that spectrum. Philosophically reason is transcendental thinking that's open to individual revelations but within the grounding context of historical inspiration, and rationalism is metaphysics congealed into a pseudo philosophy and can be referred to as immanentism or "immanent" thinking. Again, preferentially speaking, to be existential is to be existing as a reasonable communicable individual rather than merely existing subject to one's private and others' imposed rationalized survival system.

Rationalism could say that publishing a book is a measure of success and the nearest thing to immortality; reason protests and if practiced can do so through some media including publishing a book—bound or/and electronic. "Publish or perish" is a journalistic and academic cliché. It is similar to the conviction that one must publish or give up the ghost—taken as a maxim that's essentially a sin against the Holy Spirit (in the sense of *Geist* or mind and the philosophically revealing encompassing, see Karl Jaspers' *General Psychopathology*, UCP 1963, p728).

Gestalt and holistic cognizing involves reaching a motto due to preferred considerations, and upon that plateau of assumed truth the rationale is continued while carrying a placard; it often presumes a base for schools of thought but in fact "None...can claim to explain...or provide an all-embracing theory of psychic life as it really is" 161. See also *Nietzsche, an Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, U. Arizona Press, 1965, p 35, footnote, where gestalt becomes an immutable premise and short circuits reason's empathy-role in communication. In normal life we all use holistic and gestalt thinking, and sometimes it works to some degree regardless of journalistic propaganda and other forces.

Phenomenal epiphany and/or serendipity, not *epiphenomenalism*, is one major subject emphasized in this memoir—a reality-restrained revelation over rationalizing is given preference. Schism is often the result of rationalism, and the suffix "ism" in this memoir—and any proper translation of Jaspers' works—refers to a radical use of power and the harvesting of powers. Essentially epiphenomenalism is "evolutionism"—note the "isms"—, an erroneous immutable major premise meaning that humankind developed from the simpler to the complex, from material to consciousness, and then, it's erroneously believed that consciousness produced an idea of God as an abstraction from a life limited to a mundane frame of reference—a hubristic producing tenet that's an antiscientific regional, provincial, premise even when morphed into a major cosmic premise (presumed to begin at one of the infinite "big bang" visualized events).

The philosophical concept, the overview, of this memoir is that life is neither assumed as complex nor simple, but rather that the mind is limited and in need of data including the guidance gleaned from one's particular history and history in

general—thus the significance of the lighthouse-cover and of preserving guiding lights along life's shore. There is the seminal light of reason and the paradigmatic lights.

Here *Concept* is not used in the mere sense of perceiving something and then conceiving it and then confusing a conjured idea with what is perceived or perceivable. Though too tersely put, “concept” includes what comes from the source of consciousness and our conscious awareness in general and is made distinctive by...conscience. My memoir is in part an autobiography, and as regards my parents, especially my father, it is a continued biographical study and uses textbooks on “concepts” (Jaspers’ works) like his *General Psychopathology* “to give structure to what has been observed” (GP 681), i.e. to give an informed structure to my observations.

References to any of Jaspers’ books are reliable as concept-textbooks. My memoir can be complementary within limits. The limits are constant, as constant as my own forewarnings for the reader to be on alert and maintain the lingering awareness that photogenic and academic displays should be seen as worthwhile if first seen critically as possible attempts to make objective what in reality participates in some pseudo-objectivity (GP 680). I mean this: The exercise of relating recalled events and the meanings given them should not be given greater credence because associated with the name and works of Karl Jaspers—though the bearish and bullish risks are there. The investment of exploiting Jaspers name and works is an educative risk, and depends on how much participation others are willing to invest.

Jaspers’ works have been criticized as being convoluted, the particular critic here meaning that Jaspers’ works lack transparency. If one says that about Jaspers’ works it should be heard on the *qui vive*; it’s a signal of one’s disloyalty to labored reason. A similar degree of such criticism can be said of my memoirs’ *Concept Index*, and the correctness of the accusation has some justification. But there is the transcendental other side that is no less justified and is best described in this quote: “I consider it fatal simply to adjust at a low level” if one gives in to the expression “that this book is too hard for students” (GP xi).

If one has appropriated Jaspers’ logic, the argument that Jaspers’ works are convoluted is clearly seen as an effort to escape facing up to predecessors’ contributions, those that are hard to compete with by those seeking notoriety. It offers an excuse for simply deconstructing everything because things are too hard to evaluate and distracts from hubristic agendas. The excuse side of the rationale is that it takes so much time that new ideas places ambitious academicians at a disadvantage. So the rules are reduced, and only popular language and hand movements are introduced as a new song and dance. This is the mode-of-operation behind “**radical constructivism**” and “**constructivism**”.

Constructivism—and it is an ism—is a radical begging of this question: In **post-modern** times there is enough updated knowledge for one to beg for handicap privileges over predecessors such as the mapping of the human genome and the bit of probability involved in vectoring some subatomic phenomena that

momentarily delimits the uncertainty principle. Subatomic physics and micro bio (microbiology) successes are exploitable, are rustled into a corral constructed for some particular purpose such as a constructivism's construction designed to...circumvent the contributions of precursors or ancestors. Constructivism evades the need for remembering...convoluted...history, that inevitable eternal recurrence due to unlearning and the limits of thinking. Constructivists want to repeat history with stylistic designs that make it appear that they have "evolved" to a higher level than that manifested by pre-archaic and prehistoric humankind.

Chapter 1

The beginning of a definition regarding what Jaspers means by one's historicity but starting at a point in one's existence. Historicity involves a case study of the self and extends to the horizons of others' case histories in our world of others. It processes through, for example, Greek history, including not only the occident (West) but orient history also. For the protestant it penetrates NT and OT recorded events bypassing Rome as a forceful reality but one to be attentively reckoned with. See his philosophical biography and his reply to critics, *Library of Living Philosophers*...Karl Jaspers, Tudor, 1957, p.772

Begins the application of Jaspers' exposition on the difference between "Catholicism" and "Protestantism" (*Philosophical Faith and Revelation*, e.g.: p. 353ff, Collins London, 1967).

Jung's anima archetype p. 4, (and p. 159)—See Jaspers *General Psychopathology*, p.293 Jung-references are included in the "Name Index" of GP, U. of Chicago Press, 7th edition, 1963. See also his critique of Jung PFR p.118.

Guilt p.7f—Begins the application of Jaspers' four categories of guilt. See Jaspers' *The Question of German Guilt*, p.31f, Capricorn 1961.

Suicide application—General Psychopathology, UCP, 1963, 279f, a fugue-state (loss of self identity's buoyancy and spiral into a quest for nil), the beginning of an individualism's world where another individual is needed to touch ground. See *Kirkbright's A Biography, Navigations in Truth*, (Yale U.P.2004) the Enno chapter. Enno committed suicide as close to the day of Richard's funeral as can be determined in 1931—See my Chapters 5, and 6.

More on suicide—Jaspers was more of an independent churchman than his father. One can speculate as to the reason Jaspers' father recommended that Karl retain church membership for community-health purposes. But his father cleared the books by withdrawing his membership before he died. I would speculate that when his son Enno committed suicide, the father recoiled against what was said and being said at the funerals of such unfortunate victims. See his philosophical autobiography in *Library of Living Philosophers*, and *Philosophy and the World*.

Begins the application of a basic philosophy of a psychology of life—Begins the quest for qualified life v. avoiding death at all costs, applying Jaspers' *Existenz* philosophy, *Reason and Existenz*, Noonday, 1955. See also *Library of Living Philosophers*, Karl Jaspers, Tudor, 1957, p xix.

Guilt as knowledge p.1—Earlier I had missed what Pa had in his hand in the second photo (the blocked text was later revised). A closer look at particulars discovered Pa holding an apple. He had probably just picked it,

for it was the time of year for ripe apples. It would be seen as a metaphorically rich cipher (cipher means symbol for the time being). He was about to eat of the tree of knowledge of right and wrong. He was about to reap the results of rationalism, that morally loose rational process that is sometimes led by an urge lubricated by that cyrenaic (metaphysic of pleasure) leap from the state of euphoria when everything seems to be coming up roses and both God and the Devil seem to be suspiciously and conveniently indistinguishable. Rationalism is about to be caught nude and on public display. Some guilt is unsought. Some is a given, like he did not create life's limits but in fact willfully participated in the limits, and this time the woman cannot be an excuse, i.e., she cannot absorb his share of responsibility.

For Jaspers' systematic contributions regarding guilt in all its generals and particulars, see Edwin Latzel's summary—with Jaspers' approval—on pp 197-201, LLP. The thoroughness of this systematic way of appreciating guilt shows that there is no rest for the those having the conscience-consciousness to know guilt and to face the responsibility for rectifying though aware of the insurmountable dimensions required to undo past conduct.

Chapter 2

Growth of an ear p.10—No *Darwinian-ear* here, but hearing from the source of consciousness. (See PFR p. 300, “Unchanging man”)

The meaning of the “growth of an ear...” carries no suggestion that a consciousness for receiving in-depth information is the consequence of the degeneration of an animal specialty (from morphological ears to a morphological deviation and on to an abstracting psychic ear and extrapolating anthropomorphically God's ear to hear supplications). The “ear” is not suggesting a degeneration that incrementally adapts by the progressive growth of abstraction as need seems to arise. I mean we cannot draw any conclusive notions from the specialty and potential for human understanding—nor can the human become boot-strap-lifting specialists on the thinkers' origin. When that mistaken effort is elevated to a scientific principle it presents a slick slippery decline from that presumed substratum into saying, that, once there's consciousness of abstraction the logical step is that we deceive ourselves with a god concept.

That Darwinian-ear-thinking, that “once-famous ‘*theory of degeneration*’” is what Jaspers describes as an intuited notion that exchanges the scrutiny of human physiognomy proper “for a naturalistic pseudo-science”. Such degeneration involves a concept which if one wants to get hold of it firmly in relation to the empirical facts, the notion “melts away from one's grip” (GP 265f). Using that scientific logic, the inverse is epistemological true too: Concepts of progress escape us too and get lost in the encompassing awareness of infinite origins.

The growth of an ear to hear for understanding the elderly—while making allowances for brain cell atrophy—develops while also knowing that some very old people show no psychic deterioration (GP @ 686). Regarding the

characteristics of hearing and understanding, humankind has always been characteristically human, we cannot conceive of humankind being different whether comparisons are made with an ape's morphology or a dachshund's intellectual gaze—PFR 300.

Empathy is simply cultivated and exercised but it is not a new growth but rather it is tapping one of the deeper characteristics without which humankind would not be distinct.

Existenz, p. 10—Library living Philosophers, Jaspers, p. xix, “a self suspended between itself and Transcendence from which it derives its being and on which it is based”. That concept amounts to more but at least a mental therapeutic exercise and if an infinite spin or swirl can be imagined it becomes the essence of what Jaspers means by the “Encompassing”.

The mundane-heaven divide p. 10— See the Grasping of Being in the Subject-object Polarity (from Von Der Wahrheit) *Truth and Symbol* (TS), College UP 1959.

Contemplation/Prayer, and Holy “Other” p. 10—TS, @ 76ff. The ingenuousness of philosophical open-mindedness is somewhat comparable to prayerful genuflecting but without the institutional expectations regarding posture and traditional sounds. Religious prayers, e.g. Gregorian chants, can be more metaphysical than philosophical. Metaphysics can be incorrectly called philosophy especially when philosophy is conceptually reduced to a metaphysic that wants to take flight while denying wings. For example see Suzanne Kirkbright's *Jaspers'...Navigations*, YP, p 136, the “Gregorian chant” reference— which she gives a compromising slant—regarding Heidegger's metaphysical joining in rather than Jaspers' independent philosophical stance regarding the political situation, i.e. that precipitant Nazi climate.

Hubristic risks, p.11—See GP @ 711ff, “from social anamnesis [individual case reports] to historical material”.

Direct access to God, p. 12—See PFR, p. @ 352. Jaspers as a philosopher and psychologist does not confine method to a premise that infers that organizations of men cannot be circumvented in the search for truth.

Steering urges toward the normal, p. 12—This description of my father's priming can be misread. Both writer and reader must bring something sublime into this dialectical description, i.e. it should be read as dialectical idealism more than dialectical materialism (dialectical referring to the dialogue process in communication). My description of Pa's department is misleading if the readers' thought upon approach is fundamentally base (iniquitous). Without the sublime, Jaspers' quote applies: “such works [my descriptions of Pa's displays] are like mirrors; if an ape peeks in, no apostle will look back” *Reason and Existenz*, Noonday 1955.

Without that faith, only what stands out—to even the most academic of readers—will be inductions that are then deduced to be mere data tending to confirm Freudian and “evolutionary” notions—those and like notions that when extrapolated to the ultimate extinguish whatever essentially makes humankind potentially distinct in origin and destiny. Without the refined biblical and philosophical eye of faith (inner and upward turned eye), the metaphysical eye's interpretation (what we add to what is being perceived physically—one eye

always on the physical and synchronized to the other eye) of corporeal descriptions triumphs over the better part of continued and penetrating reasoning. The danger of talking about my observations of nuances carries the unfortunate risk of suggesting that my father could be a dirty old man or womanizer. He was not.

Old age, p 14—“It seems as if we were closing the books on something that is still in progress” and what we just started must be handed to tyros (beginners)—*Philosophy and the World*, p. 313f, Gateway, 1963; and also *Library LP, Jaspers*, 94. Old age offers a “large store of firm [psychic] possessions” simultaneous with “an impoverishment of psychic stores” GP 683. And in both my father then and me now (elderly), our “original Anlage (open-ended inherited disposition)”, though different, manifests itself more uninhibitedly, i.e. displays those personality tendencies that had “formerly been hidden under the élan of youth”. My father’s normal and healthy disposition did not need to be suppressed by cover-ups. He was more above board and straight forward than not.

Chapter 3

Marriage conduct and guilt p. 16—See Jaspers on marriage where he seems to rephrase Jesus’ view on marriage and divorce, and the degradation of marriage by e.g. “Catholic theologians” who save marriages from the stigma of unchastity “...only by ecclesiastical sanction”, which leads to marriage-immorality. *Man in Modern Age*, @ 60f. However, catholic—whether small or large case “Cc”—as a radical concept is found in both Protestantism and Catholicism but more dangerous in the latter because the power is larger and has longer lasting momentum (PFR) and it is a latent potential seed waiting for the right ground and atmosphere for emerging to defend the institutional faith. But in biblical style, God will judge even the marriage bed (Heb. 13:4).

And in keeping the bed inviolable and responsible, Jaspers’ health and Gertrude’s (sister’s) health can serve as a worthy birth-control hypothesis: they had no children but for their literary productions (See LLP, 13, same in *Philosophy and the World*, 201). Spared the unavoidable difficulties and risks of child rearing and much of what others suffered, Jaspers ends the Karl/Gertrude saga—in his philosophical autobiography—with talk about guilt and its consequence, i.e. the compensating need for hard work.

The medical situation p. 16ff—Jaspers addresses and accesses this medical situation of his era. He is writing during the year of 1931, the same year that first-born second-to-die Richard passed (see my Chapter 6). See also *Philosophy and the World*, The idea of the Physician, doctor, and patient 153ff. See also “personal role of doctor” *The Nature of Psychotherapy* 27ff, Phoenix 1965, and *Meaning of Medical Practice* found in GP @790ff.

Guilt’s reflections p. 18—Pa’s guilt-manifestations as an octogenarian are valuable because he looked backward with a wisdom born of ages thus historical wisdom—his history and largely biblical history. He said enough for me to look back as Jaspers looked back and handled the guilt question by several approaches with their particular methods: guilt as: criminal, political, moral, and

metaphysical, and guilt as unavoidable and not to be sought, but upon reflection it can be illuminating.

My father's guilt includes moral guilt with its existential significance. It has to do with the survival of progeny, of the ascendancy of descendants in terms of quality more than quantity, the Abrahamic seed being more universally and spiritually real. This moral concern has to do with metaphysical guilt in the sense of a divine imperative type of law, directives essential to handling humankind's base urges. Without it there is the sin against the Holy Spirit (my application of the unpardonable sin) via the engendering of behavior that is harmful to individuals and humankind in general. (See *Question of German Guilt* pp. 69, 71)

Philosophical guilt/innocence sees ultimate situations from five conjured categories that Jaspers finds constructive: the limits of (1) thinking, (2) suffering, (3) guilt, (4) death, and those four (5) universally distributed and characteristic of humankind. He comes at those categories from five ways (approaches): their (1) unavoidability, (2) needlessness to seek, (3) each and all have at least a dual side, (4) no side can become an object as such, and (5) we can be philosophical and illuminate for ourselves what the realized limits offer to existence, realizations that delimit the limits.

Chapter 4

Name and non-names p. 21—Ciphers, for Jaspers, are forces that can be named or unnamed, but forces they are whether of hate or love. Within that spectrum of name and nameless (finite and infinite) names take on significance for informing and giving content and demarcation to wandering wonderings. Names when functioning reasonably are called ciphers, but there's a name for unreasonableness, like "positivism" "rationalism" and "materialism". Below; cipher and cypher are used interchangeably.

There are (Cassell's Ger. Dic. Funk and Wagnalls 1939) very few German words beginning with "c"—less than 60—and includes the word "Chiffre" and used in the sense of cipher, i.e., cryptography, but moreover always used as needing deciphering (pp 12 and 19 of TS) but never a mere excuse for indecisiveness.

When Jaspers uses the word it must be seen in this context: He uses it following his treatment of the subject of love in *Von der Wahrheit* (Concerning the Truth), which relates to affection for truth that cannot be grabbed and still be considered loving wisdom. If an ape looks at a *chiffre* no apostle will look back, as in: if the hating human looks in no lover looks back.

That term carries not only the meaning we give it when uninspired but also the affects (emotive) upon us when the cypher (also translated cipher) illuminates through no obvious rational effort though great cognizing effort has been engaged. For example, phenomena emanating from a disturbed person must be interpreted by the normal person (e.g. therapist) to mean something phenomenally subjective but much different from the patient's objective manifestations. Jaspers is coining a meaning, a clinically informed meaning in using *chiffre* (cipher) to avoid making too little of what we experience. Cypher (Again: or *chiffre*—

Cassell's New German Dictionary 1904 and revisions through the revised 1936—or cipher) involves the same flexible mode of thinking that shows up in his “eidos” and “eidology”, or idea of ideas about ideas, which is de facto and de jure (by right according to a law) the essence of “encompassing” thinking—de jure because the meaning is prior to and occupies the specific symbol.

In this case, my memoir, in a way, makes the most of the name “Lilia”; it is a coining for some general and particular purpose—first by my parents and then in my story. The fact that the name was not only initiated at her birth but also revived in Pa's last decade indicates a conscientious pointing toward truth and the transparency that the demand for truth engenders. Misconduct should not stifle the quest for what truth can be gleaned from cypher language. The name personally represents some apparent unstructured reality that is yet (back then and now forward) to be functionally structured in part to diminish, rather, sublimate feelings of guilt due to either commission or omission (See Jaspers T&S, 37ff; and PFR 92ff).

Institutional fatherhood in saintly garb is not primary in the cipher. In the case of Lilia, the dominant concept is the sinless child of God. The reactionary heavenly father idea is primary—in biblical history, because paternalism dominated the rationalism-scheme of things. In this history Jesus pointed to the father of the messiah to suppress messianic excuses for avoiding heavenly conduct. He squashed the hope in a futuristic coming perfect leader and declared the kingdom of God is within the—in this case—the grandiose excuse that allows for misbehavior. It was an incomparable finality given to the messianic process with a comparable finality uttered by Jaspers in his *The Future of Mankind* on the final page “the kingdom of God is within” the individual, “it is here” 342. Ciphers, e.g. grand expounding and small cries, are heard that way. The good-news cry has a meaning that point to the need to behave ourselves...now...to be saved from sin. We no longer sin courageously without fear and trembling.

Getting away from it all p. 22—Change of milieu can come by free will, independent thinking, and can be enforced by physician and court (incarceration, institutionalization). As the Dr. tells Macbeth that a healthy patient must minister to himself, so a family ombudsman, i.e., descendent or ascendant composes and applies a method of reeducation for the sake of tradition, culture, including freedom—contributing to the freedom to changing one's environment. See p.3 “*The Nature of Psychotherapy, a Critical Appraisal*”, Phoenix Books, UC Press 1965; or see GP @839.

Genetics and Culture p. 23. —See GP @652–670—For the importance of biographical studies, i.e., case-by-case reports, see GP “Biographical Studies” and 709ff “heredity and tradition”.

The case history of the first female member of Freud's circle, Lou Andreas-Solomé, can show how a change of environment might be useful. She became disillusioned as a young lady by a married priest's attempts to seduce her. Her physician recommended a change of milieu for her mental health. The freedom to get away from it all is something potentially beneficial, and doing so can be therapeutic. The escaper might be unaware that alternative environments might amount to adverse therapy. On this other hand getting away from one circle might

mean jumping into an unhealthy circle. Her case history is relevant to Jaspers' work on Nietzsche, U of A P, Tucson 1965, (see Index on Salomé). She jumped into the Freud circle with rippling effects.

There is also the reality of the need to get away from a concept-environment (this escape from a general view of being (existence), an ontology, is why Jaspers coined the word *periechontology* as a cipher pointing beyond the enslaving concept. *Periechontology* represents the change of milieu for repose from concepts; it includes the germ of faith and an infinitely open mind (see p 82 PFR, 201, 203). Nietzsche seemed to have chosen to remain and struggle within a bombarding and ricocheting environment of rationalism. Kierkegaard was able to transcend in and through the concept of the leap of faith. Jaspers points at Nietzsche as having lived out modernity, and penetrated into the postmodern age but failed to transcend due to being always in need of friend and lover; though he loved—I think Lou Andreas-Solomé—it was unrequited. Kierkegaard was able to transcend alone while remaining a protestant prophet within the established state church. (See conclusion for the special significance of **modernity** and **post-modernity**.)

Chapter 5

Individuality development and other-hood consciousness and conscience, p 27—Also, pain shows how I can be me and not someone else; moreover when pain makes one aware of individuality, i.e., selfhood, the discomfort in degrees from loneliness to intense pain uncorks the potential for sympathizing, i.e. when disabling pain subsides empathizing can occur, sometimes a too emphatic empathy. Pain in its varying intensities also—under normal mental connections—overcomes the fundamental differences between oneself and another. Pain is an educator but not to be sought. See Nature of Psycho...p5 Self Illumination. See also my *The Application of Jaspers' Existenz philosophy...* where pain is systematically shown to be one of the ultimate situations of life (my dissertation, Lincoln Christian Seminary, Library). And see T&S, 21ff.

The exploitation of pain in highly technical ways to propound one's plight and foster a traditional force, indicates a pathological level of selfishness when for instance a suicide bomber without risk of pain can use the pain caused to others to make a point. In this case those that die immediately are not subject to pain, but the wounded suffer terribly. A case can be made for technological terrorism in the medical/economic field, where if in seeking anesthetization the cost becomes prohibitive or at least results in serfdom-indebtedness (indentureship under duress). Of course between those two extreme polls exists the sort of culturally promoted conduct that leads to some needing an unfair amount of pain relief due to moral and nutritional misconduct. See GP, 63f, and follow General Index searching under "empathy".

Kant and critiques of pure reason p 28—My struggling with a few pages of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* was a type of religious conversion experience for me, a preacher's kid, whose religious language had become so familiar that it became inhibiting in one way but ready to metamorphose, i.e., morph. See Nature

of Psychotherapy...p 10 where how in the absence of religion philosophy or a pseudo science can serve a meaningful or meaningless purpose. See Jaspers' Great Philosophers, "Kant", and his **Philosophy and the World**, chapter on Kant's "Perpetual Peace".

Phenomenology has to do with the logical way of handling items of the psyche, i.e., the mind. The word can be seen in the historical context of modernity and post modernity (highfalutin talk about categorizing more recent events in current power struggles). Modernity begins with Kant's detailed logic, and ends with overtones of certainty regarding what is to be understood by "phenomenology"—ending in such school-thinkers like Husserl and Heidegger representing the attitude that a level of indisputable understanding had been reached, and that all back and forward looking can be safely done on that "evolved" plateau—that's post-modernity, but everything in the mind when handled becomes one's phenomenology.

Suzanne Kirkbright (Jaspers...Navigations... Yale UP 2004)—p@68— informs, with some reading between the lines, that Jaspers thought that Husserl did not really understand phenomenology. Jaspers maintains, in Kantian fashion and protestant humility, that phenomenology is a method that never foregoes, never circumvents, and never rationally transcends the limits of thinking about both ends and caps of the conceptualizing spectrum. One end of phenomenology is perceptions plus intuition and the other end concept plus intuition (or that humbling thinking best described in his final great work on "*philosophical faith and revelation*"). The spectrum-caps and flaps refer to immanence and transcendence, and encompassing the spectrum is Existenz, which sees, penetrates the objectifications' limits and reveals the transparency of a systemic congealing phenomenology.

Husserl's popularity, one can suspect, was/is not due to his having reached absolute truth or an almost unquestionable logic, but his books sold because he belonged to a club-like force with a large membership. Heidegger's popularity is due to Catholic book-buying forces, and Husserl's due to an ethnic force. Except for his marital connections, Jaspers' popularity cannot be reduced to such forces, e.g. there's the fractured unity of a protestant force wherein exists the appeal of a reasoning that outperforms sectarian or partisan biases. Protestant authors can make appeasing Catholic comments to sell books.

Outperforming, for Jaspers, was begun in the psychiatric clinic and continued and finished in a change of milieu to a neutral geographic and intellectual state (Basel, Switzerland—but even there he was pursued by Heidelberg forces to succor from his honor by imposing upon him and honorary award to this day being milked for all its worth by presenting Heidelberg's "Karl Jaspers" Award).

Chapter 6

Baptism for the dead—Here's an example of **abreaction** (meaning: making more rather than less of something, like one's baptism), of a baptizer's needs reaching beyond the needs of the baptized.

Seeking life not seeking to avoid death—alternative thinking about the unknown

Baptism p. 31—Jaspers addresses the history of church ordinances and revelation and accesses what is accessible regarding biblical revelations and making the best out of meanings. He engages Rudolf Bultmann, in debate, one whom fundamental biblical thinkers would term a liberal theologian with the expectation that a philosopher would manifest a liberal amount of rationalizing. Expectations are inverted though. The tables are turned and the liberal theologian becomes the orthodox destroyer of that part of the mind where humankind's faith potential resides. See *Myth and Christianity*, Noonday, 1958.

Though Jaspers makes a far better theological showing than Bultmann, Jaspers' in his other writings fell short of biblical thinking regarding the ordinance of Baptism.

Biblically there are similarities and differences between John's baptism and Jesus' baptism. John's baptism was limited to repentances and good works though still under the death sentence of the Mosaic Decalogue and other statutes. Because humankind is limited and death (all are guilty) by the law is unavoidable, baptism under Jesus placed more significance on grace with a view toward the fact that all sin and fall short. Even some disciples of John were re-baptized even though they had repented and declared a public commitment to avoiding sin henceforth. Those baptized by John might have been able to walk the straight and narrow for the period of time in which Jesus walked, but their overwhelming guilt would eventually return.

The gospel writers' show that Jesus and John were baptizing simultaneously but in different geographic areas, and before John was imprisoned. But one gospel writer makes sure it is understood that Jesus did not baptize anyone. Significance: Jesus was baptized by John to show that it is not the baptizer's perfection that determines the meaning of the practice of that ordinance. When John said to Jesus that he was not worthy to baptize Jesus, Jesus in effect corrected that concept by deflecting from the hubris of the agent administering the rite of baptism. The clear difference in the two baptisms is emphasized in Acts 19:4 where some were baptized under John but re-immersed under the type of Acts 2 baptism.

Here again though there is a distracting remedial potion added to the good news about living like in heaven; now being baptized under Jesus means that if the baptized do manage to morally perform acceptably it is more due to the grace of the Holy Spirit than the individual's ingenuity. Emphasis is now placed on something more objective than subjective, something that has been moving on the earth since Gen.1, the spirit of God, the only Holy Spirit.

The mode of baptism (immersion or emulsion, a sort of oxymoron) is not in question regarding biblical history. The mode became a test of power in the first millennium and the latter part of the last millennium, a test imposed first by organized ecclesiastical power in reaction to the early democratic and trickle-up church administration (like selecting elders and deacons by the local group). Latterly, the test was more emphatically applied during the challenge to the "Vatican" force from south of the Alps by the Reformers north of the Alps.

Immersion gathered momentum in Scotland and then into New England and the New World as biblical objectivity replaced “Vatican” subjectivity.

When the book, Bible, began to be offered as the standard of moral truth to give common people an alternative to bad priests, renewed attention was given to the mode of baptism. Where the severance with Rome was most successful, the biblical mode of baptism was a clear manifestation of how a corporeal establishment subtly exploits differences while on a historical roll. Baptism or emulsion not only then has meaningful textual hermeneutical force on its own, but it shows one’s decisive and reactionary commitment to either a “Vatican”-vatic or biblical authority, both in terms of the New and Old Testament faith. Baptism became a think-tank trickle-up reforming reaction to bad established religion whether in Roman times or “Vatican” Rome times.

For more see Jaspers’ *Philosophical Faith and Revelation*. Here Jaspers shows the awareness of the general significance of doctrinal ciphers (cyphers) in the struggle for power, but for some reason he avoids the contemporary significance. His awareness of the ordinances being exploited in the religious conflict over authority (individual or social) is shown on p. 356 and throughout the book, but a more current application of the mode-test (immersion or emulsion) is not touched on. I mean to my knowledge he does not address the significance of how the mode of a religious rite or ordinance can become a test of power. But there is little doubt about his awareness of where the bible and the “Vatican” fit in the struggle for and against power.

Explanation of Jaspers’ perspective—Jaspers probably had some domestic issues to contend with that contributed to his lack of appreciation for the importance of the mode of baptism in the historic exploitation of ordinance-cyphers.

He married into an orthodox Jewish family, which would have softened his expressions for Old Testament familial ears. The change from the radical mode of the OT ordinance of circumcision to NT baptism would have been difficult for Jaspers to put into print for OT orthodoxy to find digestible.

There is another consideration: Jaspers knew Kierkegaard well, and one cannot know Kierkegaard and the history of Church doctrine and the history of the Church and State issue without knowing that the Denmark State Church required all be “baptized”. Moreover Jaspers would have been aware of Kierkegaard’s actual penetration of the rite and thus making its exploitation transparent (see below **Concluding Concepts in Dexterity**).

But the apparent fact is that baptism was more than, but at the very least, an abreaction and a transactional alternative to the foreskin...of moral thinking. That mode of purifying and making universal the seed of Abraham by moving away from an organ’s sanitary sanction and into baptism for cleansing, was a recoiling from the existing state of powers in Judea and in Rome. It put the base urge and phallic point—the essence of [f]reudianism—in proper moral perspective. Circumcision had become a symbol of religio-national force and exploited as such. The change in cipher or mode of changing the heart was to become exploited too but in rebellion against the established apostolic authority

represented by the immersion mode. The move was away from cleansing the mind to a rite of passage into the gang.

Chapter 7

As regards my parent's personality traits and the conversion process adjusted to their preconstitutions and predispositions (Anlage)—When tradition goes into remission to show up again in some later generation, genetics and recessive traits play a part in its re-emergence—such as attitudes toward suicide. Predisposition includes some sensitivity against or for an automatic jump, such as the immediate jump to judgment that life is too precarious to be endured. There's a possible engrained homing-flight urge, a strong urge for a repose in a regained domestication gone awry, a recoiling from a frightening scanning of life ultimate situations, a withdrawal from an uncomfortable abstraction, a withdrawal from reality's onslaught coming through the senses.

There's a vague remembrance of origin and a yearning for it. Genealogy plays some part we know but know less also. As there is preconstitution there is predispositions (GP @501) and all of what can and cannot be determined from the perspectives of heredity. It appears the individual's fundamental constitution has some dependence on preconstitution and predisposition about which we know less the more we know. This is the frame of reference for Jaspers' use of "anlage" and includes the accumulation of immeasurable combinations of genes and complicated by inherited traits that suddenly show up in remote times and complemented by specific cultural phenomena that might stimulate reactions or transactions. See 503 where "unfavorable 'Anlagen' are dormant in the humane race" and "favorable 'Anlagen are equally 'cumulative'".

The way Jaspers uses the German word "anlage" is that it participates in similar ways with the meaning of our word "personality" but without hubris, i.e. without the limiting that positivism often associates with talk about personality and the warping of individuality (see "post-individualism" as a Catholic new order below).

It is easy to find concepts that fit into specific situations especially in reference to Jaspers' concepts for they make up a logical system that's adjustable for fitting a variety of situations. His historically constant but flexible concepts' applicability is systemic. For instance in GP he addresses the importance of a patience's attitude toward symptoms, and the role of attitude ranges from being healthy to unhealthy and then becomes pathological if cantilevering over too far (See GP, 425)—sometimes one can ignore symptoms or exaggerate them.

We are all patients who compensate, so the concepts apply in degrees. All GP concepts begin to come to fore in "Biographical Study" (671ff) and then materialize more extensively in "Society and History" and especially his "theory of degeneration" (742) and makes a grand finale worldview by looking through the spectacles of the full range of kaleidoscopic concepts in "The Human Being As A Whole" where deeper judgment over and above the holistic is seen if at all "in a flash" (775).

Mumps p 38—Effects of early and late castration and the inconclusive effects can have affects (on affections) on thinking about health and testing it too. The suspicion about the effect of a disease could bring normal curiosity and proceed to a testing phase (633). The conversion episode for the protestant psychology of religion is treated on p 731. The protestant myth area of the psyche is defended in detail in his debate with Bultmann, a preference for protestant soil is manifested more clearly in PFR.

Jaspers' logic has at its core the primary psychopathological handling of experience applied to abnormal performances and then applied at the vignette-edge of normal psychology—see 731 where he demonstrates a consistent and constant appreciation for the absurd (revelation) and its affectation on individual freedom of thought. The myth area that he defended so well from Bultmann's demythologizing becomes a strong effect compared to the holy orders of Catholicism affecting humankind universally. Without the myth area of the mind the brain's activity can be satisfied with an empirical system that stifles.

There's a need to constantly evaluate the force that cultural objectivities' effects have on subjective weaknesses or on objective strengths. When these forces are ignored or accepted unquestionably, a Catholic (c or C) one orderly world emerges. Catholicism sees protesting as an aberration from the ordinary order. Protesting is easily condemned as a careless knocking of the props out from under those who need the props, need the confessional, and need the penance imposed by the group. Propping becomes a vicious circle of circular illogicality. Efforts to assist the propped then become propaganda fodder for castigating missionary endeavors that are different from what a religious group traditionally approves (792).

So, independent of any confessional, conceptually my father's subjective struggling with the question of virility becomes an issue between himself and God. It becomes objectively manifested in giving the test a sublimated slant. In other words I can illuminate for myself that I owe my birth to protestant soil with less contrition than the confessional stall imposes. Free from guilt (original sin and Catholic) I can unreservedly contribute out of attrition (some sorrow) to the more authentic self-imposed penance inherited from my father.

Chapter 8 and 9

The protestant principle (PFR 334) as described by Jaspers is involved in this mending process. The 1000 years of humankind-experience as recorded in the bible are broad enough for hearts in need of mending to find parallel kindred situations, but yet there's an enduring constant faith that defies conclusive biblical interpretations. There's enough variety, sane and insane, recorded to meet the changing situations peculiar to any time and place.

In my parent's case, Lilia's cry is an event prodding toward practice but it must never be looked on as something permanently good. It should not be something necessary so that the resulting corrective actions turn the cry into a revelation, and sin into a necessity so that grace-stimulated good-works ends up justifying misconduct and irresponsibility. Sanctifying the episode by elevating it

to license and into licentiousness and on to social decadence is unacceptable. Static-vatic authority will not fit the needs of those with philosophical buoyancy. It does not function immediately enough for an individual's emerging crises.

For my father the same reasonableness involved in an intellectual approach to the Bible is held onto as the biblical form of thinking rolls along. Lilia's cry never becomes a revelation from God and made into a Saint due to the healing effects of guilt's attempt to make amends. A guilt's good-worker or healer is not a saint maker. Elevating the cry does not cancel misconduct but overwhelms the circumstances of some perceived and conceived transgression. The cry remains a cipher (or cypher), an indistinct though clear cipher, the interpretation of which is never a closed book or a crystallized cypher that can become a necessary divine imperative or precept. The echo is heard without turning a cry into a fading whimper to be replaced by a hallelujah for the community to hear. It is heard with the inner ear and motivates the mending process and contributes to perpetual peace.

My parents are about to come face to face with the political methods of "The Church" as described in Jaspers (PFR @44). It's on p 40 that he says he prefers to speak for biblical rather than Christian religion, the latter meaning that phase of Christianity that was transformed when it entered the political arena (44), including that always ready to emerge inquisition tendency lurking in readiness for freedom to relax. Without philosophical prophets church authority rears up with the force of a refined inquisition updated and camouflaged by feedback (scientists called to report at the "Vatican"). When freedom is relaxed and uniformed educators are tolerated the political church could emerge though not transparent because hidden behind a secular legislative landscape always willing to accommodate a voting bloc (45).

Chapter 10 and 11

Eidos and eidology—One of the purposes of this Chapter 10 about dogs and hallucinations is to show how false perceptions can be conceptually composed. We are addressing psychic phenomena and we start with a psychopathological category or form of thinking and apply it to less abnormal situations. In GP 66f *Abnormal Psychic Phenomena* are referred to as "hallucinations proper", and from that pole he feathers off into addressing some basic unquestionable specific factors such as "subjective eidectic images". A clear example of eidectic imagery is the after-image:

In New Mexico (my Chapter 25) after hours of hoeing goat-head plants (*tribulus terrestris*) while in blossom, the yellow-blossomed plants would appear for hours upon closing my eyes. That's a degree of the eidectic event, the after-image. (This yellow-on-green while searching for the rooted stems might relate to the yellow rose in my memoir.) Jaspers sites a case: Due to chemical inducements the false perception of a yellow rose appeared (68), and this false perception included the awareness of its subjective nature and as something seen with an inner eye, at least the perceptual side of the inner eye.

Some individuals, those referred to as eidectics, after reading a page can actually see and read from the page, and intentional modifications in the page can be made and forgotten correctly or incorrectly as qualifying or modifying properties. If the page is seen as having the page-contents in front or behind the page, or changes have been otherwise made then we are leaving the clear area of eidectic description and moving toward hallucination proper—depending on the intensity of consciousness about what is being added or removed. Here the conceptual side of the inner eye is engaged and the composite takes a conglomerate form and sometimes capricious.

In distinguishing false hallucinations from abnormal perceptions Jaspers' process moves clearly toward descriptions by patients that see clearly the role of the conscious awareness, see with alertness an objective-subjective polemic within a conscious grasp of an encompassing normal reality. I mean some are and some are not aware of the difference between reality and hallucination, and the same would be true of eidectics' experiences. Some individuals and even whole cultures conceivably might always remain unaware of the objective-subjective polemic (see *Truth and Symbol* and GP 497ff on "Heredity" and especially 709ff "Heredity and tradition").

The constant in humankind is demonstrated by the fact that left on our own without substitutions for critical thinking we can adjust in complex ways to confusing ideas like learning to live with hallucinations by integrating them constructively or less destructively within normal reality to fit into societal tolerant allowances (see GP 416 "Working through illness in chronic states").

Jaspers proceeds to a thorough consideration of something constant and that which makes the "*human species*" distinct (617ff). "*The idea of Eidos*", or the idea of ideas (encompassings) involves whole thinking, but no whole concept or idea about thinking can be absolute. In the end though there is nothing definitively conclusive; humankind's distinctiveness is more intuitive than rationally based (as his humankind schema shows, see Concept Index for Chapter 26, and *Origin*, p 27 where the schema of humankind's history is encompassed by one origin and one goal of humankind "*on the earth*" [emphasis mine]).

So, rather than my father's dog descriptions being taken as a mere symbol of naïve thinking, "cypher" reading here siphons from the constant in humankind's history. With regard to my father's descriptions, Jaspers' point can apply: "...man as an accidental aggregate of individual factors or as an original specific whole...is not a true alternative", i.e. those alternatives do not fit the study of functional ideas about ideas where understanding predominates over chance and absolute thinking.

Reading cypher-language includes reading ideas of ideas, and individual case histories are plateaus that are occupied constantly throughout with an open-ended overview of humankind's history. Every *individualized selfhood* begins life's experiences with scrutinizing the self but always unsuccessfully when maturely accountable—individuality does not start with normal thinking done in a normal pop-culture.

In short, if the idea of the self-idea cannot remember its own beginning and cannot conceive of its own ultimate end, that limit becomes a humankind

constant, an invariable never becoming a bootstrap pull to an elevated plateau of known origin. Hallucinations are made up of real but very fragmented experiences, but one is living in a dream world if one thinks that the thinker can determine the origin of thinking. So it is a humankind-constant, a specialty that allows immortality to permeate our eidologies while maintaining contact with empirical (mortal) ground (about which there is always more to be discovered and what appears obviously depends somehow on what is not apparent).

Jaspers sites examples of personages that learn to live with their hallucinations. My son Jack provided home care for a head wounded vet. In the privacy of his home and after he got to know Jack, the vet would ask if he could see his father (long deceased) in the room. Jack would answer that he may be but I don't see him. But with inanimate things like a plate of food, Jack could say, "no, there is nothing there". Of course the vet in reality had to ask himself the question about false hallucinations first.

Chapter 12

Jaspers has some quality comments about race (@618). In the norm, that is in general, we might be tempted to think that variations in human appearances indicate that human life is in transition, as something on the way to decadence or something growing in value. "Accordingly he either earns the name of hybrid, mongrel, trash or is forced to prove himself as a full human being with heightened possibilities". Other than the obvious feeling for the need to prove oneself as a human being, such classifications seem to zero in on the "particular in its singularity and not on the biological whole of human life" (619). See *Philosophy and the World*, "racism" p 188.

What he is saying is that regardless of where one lands on the range of the spectrum of differences, the differential curve, there is a greater more ubiquitous whole that has two sides; one side relates to the idea of what is essential to humankind and the other side the realization that the idea is not a whole idea in complex reality (thus the limits of holistic and gestalt psychology, GP 160 second whole paragraph). With that understanding about the limits of ideas Jaspers refers to that process of wondering within the confines of objective and subjective science as "the Eidos of man" (618). He avoids ciphers that sound in meaning like a taxonomy, or phylum, or a tree of rank.

To superficially concentrate on the particular singularities easily consumes itself in the singularity of an idea, and that then is extrapolated to an unquestionable whole. In other words within the perimeters of particular premises it is easy to fall into thinking that what distinguishes humankind-biology is due to and limited to controlled breeding resulting in values that can be determined as invaluable or of lesser value, and that the process can be reversed. Jaspers says: "Yet we only need to formulate such thoughts to see the futility" (619). Using that illogicality, there is as much support for humankind coming from apes as for returning to apes.

The particular differences can only be interpreted in light of the whole humankind-constant. Part of this "Eidos" or whole flexible and accommodating

conceptual approach to race includes the fact that “historically speaking every population is a mixed population” (668). And where the extant or prevailing race stands out within the population, Jaspers can—but thinks better of it—use the word “evolution” (as translated GP 668) as applicable sometimes to race and not population universally. The word smacks of rank and rancor and it is doubtful whether Jaspers would use a Darwinian word if it tended to enforce the fallacy of a metaphysical origin (see *Way to Wisdom* 189, Darwin’s system of causalities “implies the destruction of any sense of authentic life”).

Jaspers’ prophetically (though not a “Big Bang” priest, e.g., a Catholic priest is given and accepts credit for the “big bang” theory) sees the futility of this universalization of “evolution” as obvious seen in his awareness of the significance of mtDNA (GP 511) and the insignificance for humankind. His eidos of humankind sees no big banging single origin (singularity in knowable principle) for humankind, and even if there is some maternal particulars that can be localized in time and space, the paternal contributions to variations and constancy is no less an origin-determinant. The complexity of the reality is unavoidable whether mapping the human genome or mapping some particular geometric migration paths. In a wholesome formulation, regarding geographical and historical processes, what goes around has already gone around, so the idea that controlled breeding can affect racial appearance is not the same as races that are distinguished over long periods of time due to “involuntary breeding” (GP 668) and in a plate moving and colliding world. Positivism here is improper to the point of...hallucination proper.

Chapter 13, 14, and 15

The potentially applicable references to any of Jaspers’ works seem unlimited. That is why the novice will find comfort in saying Jaspers is convoluted. His philosophical logic, his system of handling his personal world and the world of others in the clinical world to the worldview-world involves concepts that fit in adjustable fashion to all experience. The novice’s tasks entail knowing how to apply these concepts when using psychopath-tools delicately in the prevailing normal world.

We don’t use electric apparatuses as such like electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) to discombobulate brain function, but in principle a form of hard knock shock treatment can produce a rearrangement and disconnecting of inhibiting ideas. The task in the normal world then turns into a major concern over how to avoid too much planning in a technological world of immediate information (the internet information highway). With the availability and application of such technology it could interfere with personal achievements—a disruption in therapeutic results in the unfolding process of the individual’s anlage—a discombobulating comparable to the application of shock treatment via some psychopathic-hard-tools.

For example, regarding the applicability of Jaspers’ writings, the references to Jaspers’ works regarding Chapters 13, 14 and 15 can be found throughout his General Psychopathology textbook. The extensive “name” and “general” index offers easy references and that makes for a more effective exercising of forms of

thinking. The forms of thinking adjust mildly or intensively depending on the degree of the aberration first within the clinical setting in that textbook (from schizophrenia to the unusual eidetic), and then later in his dealing with worldviews that can produce world wars (The Future of Mankind).

Chapter 14's loose use of "hallucination" is actually the interaction of the distinctions made between that word, plus "illusion" and "delusion"—as defined by Jaspers in GP, p. 64, (d) and p.95, (a), 1963, Hoenig-Hamilton translators, U of Chicago Press). All meanings are involved in a fluctuating, overlapping, and superimposing constellational way in the wagon-wheel situation. For instance, the illusion perhaps was a combination of fever-caused dizziness (vertigo), the swirl transposed to the multi-sash window; the hallucination springing into the matter as the wagon wheel rolled in space and involved timing to avoid it, etc.—and all this included that circumstantial taste. The delusion could include the dis-ease of the flue and concomitant conviction that it was real based on my early independent emotional experience and prospective worldview-like interpretation (involving that early experience when my father mercy-killed the dog crushed by the wagon wheel). Moreover though, lasting psychopathic results were prevented by mother's presence and timely reassurance and including the application of the cold washcloth.

My parents' change of milieu, i.e. the move from Michigan's emotional storms to Alabama involves what Jaspers refers to as methods of reeducation (see, and more specifically the change from state to state, e.g. the change in environment is crude but can work, see p 5 *Nature of Psychotherapy* Phoenix, 1965 "liberation from the troubles of [one's] personal world, [one] gains strength and can progress".)

Occupational therapy as a method, though normally unwittingly therapeutic, is seen in my mother's self-imposed preoccupation with carvings upon returning to the former environment. Abstract animal forms become a safer reference and absorbing point for emotion. Animal forms become substitutes for the in-depth emotion required for human relations. Utilizing the general Index (and name index too if the limits of specific forms of school thinking are needed, such as: Jung and Freud) can be fruitful for average world assistance if the fruitful information is picked and only tasted. For these chapters 13-15, research "World, concept of"; and search "Hallucinations, hallucinatory".

Our family's circumstance was conducive to my parents creating their own world for sublimation. They had, partly due to the circumstances of race and pop-culture, the advantage of *laissez-passer* for interstate travel, and the enculturation of *laissez-faire* in the protestant emphasis on independence, and an ethos offering alternative occupational choices (The Origin and Goal of History, @189ff).

The reason for index-searching under "World forms" in Jaspers' GP is because it's preparatory for developing a sensitivity towards seeing worldviews and handling them the way Jaspers did in his later works. In other words we begin with his philosophical and scientific attitude in rough-ground form (as in grinding rough edges off newly smelted and formed products) in the clinical/empirical

laboratory while honed and refined in the world at large as systematically presented in his *Philosophie*, 1948.

The core of reason was dialectically polished in his reply to his critics in the Library of Living Philosophers—and burrowing points restored and sharpened later in “Philosophical Faith and Revelation” as if to rebuff the unapproved title *The Perennial* [that word has definite Darwinian overtones] *Scope of Philosophy* which was published in German as *Der Philosophische Glaube* or The Philosophical Faith, or faith’s philosophy—which knows of no perimeters without windows for revelation to shine and reflect through one’s historicity including one’s informed biblical history.

Chapter 16

The episode that defined the difference between Jung and Freud p. 87—

Animals appear sometimes to have the knack to sense things humans do not, like a dog that sniffs at cancer. Then there is Oscar the nursing-home cat that appears to respond distinctively to dying patients. It’s unknown how much the fear, the anxiety of receiving insufficiently displayed feelings in the company of others can lead to such metaphysical references (111), like interpreting an animal’s rare behavior as pointing toward the periphery of immortality—as regarding the deer’s behavior and relative to new unattached feelings floating freely due to the loss of mother, and creating a void for an animal’s abnormal behavior.

In this chapter the pathological forms (rather: more mildly put, the aberrant forms) of handling mental (phenomenology’s inner eye) and objective experience (visual and audio phenomena) are carried over into the normalcy realm in the “mother and deer” experience. In extreme schizophrenic cases there occur delusions of reference that can be presented as a flight of happiness, exuberant springing or bouncing off anxiety, or plunging into a depressing ocean of pre-experience-ideas, retrospective ideas that take flight in some prospective interpretations of unusual events.

A more normal reaction to the affective states, those feelings over the loss of a loved one, can find sufficient enduring day to day strength by avoiding making connections at all—referred to by Jaspers as retardation contrasted with the more immediate transference (retardation in the sense of retarding or advancing the spark of a model A Ford for starting and running purposes, where retarding the spark can avoid the arch completely, or advancing so far as to kick back as the designed rotation is inverted @218). See also delusions of feelings and sequential reference to note how animals become supporting references for inferences (115). (Incidentally the definition of schizophrenia is best on p 219.)

Animals are a part of our world of experience and the world of experiences we are born into. They are fascinating and attract us for the specialty that seems to make them behave in abnormal ways as though more sensitive in ways where we are not finely in tune. We look for explanations or entirely avoid understanding not wanting to “go there” like to the precipice of death (see: Dying 477) and look to animal behavior to enforce our intuition about immortality without having to

come to purely human terms with the uncertainty of death and the certainty of its unknown.

Jaspers is cautious about the animals he uses in his examples for he was aware of the tendency to use morphology as ontological proof or disproof about the origin of “being”; thus he uses a dachshund’s intelligent gaze instead of an ape’s physiognomy to make a point.

The animals’ fixated specialty within the curved limits whether wild or domestic is included in our fascination for animals, a universal fascination that can be harvested as a force for some claim on totality: “everything creative seems to be converted into an absolute” (857) especially for “materialistic and positivist philosophies” (858) and is transferred into the infinity of the DNA world which presents an infinite ground for “changes in jargon” conjured to keep one step ahead of the higher quality of scientific processes. Humankind’s “finiteness cannot become self-contained, in the same sense as the animal”, *Perennial* 66. “Every animal is perfect in its own way, in its limitation it fulfills itself within a continually repeated life cycle...only man cannot fulfill himself in his finiteness”—e.g. the scientific attitude described more by process than progress.

Chapter 17 and 18

Ruminations represent, in this phase of my recollections, an empirically based effort to make sense, to make connections. To the degree that information is unavailable, the connections made participate in possible pathology (take questionable directions) though composed of real possibilities that are in principle uncertain, i.e. not sharable (universally) as conclusive. These ruminations can run very close to the edge of being abnormally received—depending on a reader’s superficiality or profundity.

The nature of this biography (memoir) can—to the reader or hearer—take on a psycho-pathos appearance, i.e., an imagination taking flight or bogging down. Especially this is true if it’s forgotten that the author is looking for significance in the recollections and that—“these phenomena...[have significance] for the creativity of the individuals concerned” GP 728. The ruminations have textbook-like value for me, but for others, admittedly, my ruminations can appear as didactic case-examples for a textbook on psychopathology. That is the way it should be to the scientific attitude where criticism can go too far into uncertainties and get rutted, or criticism can be so light that the imagination takes pseudo scientific flight.

Nevertheless, though the connections occurred to me personally as a flash of enlightenment, be alert! Jaspers is alert to the weaknesses inherent in flash revelations, but they have possible value as seen in this statement: “Where there is insufficient material, pathology [biographically based conclusiveness] becomes ridiculous (e.g. pathographies concerning Jesus and Mohammed)” 729—Jaspers parenthesis.

Thinking under momentum can quickly take what can appear to others to be an aberrant path. It can be seen as aberrant by the thinker too, but just as quickly

justified in a flash for some plan held religiously that enhances the circumstances of one's power. The handling of mental phenomena that have known and even greater unknown aspects becomes a matter of either metaphysical risk or philosophical wisdom—preferably more of the latter but unavoidably some of the former.

Jaspers' basic forms for handling psychopathic material are forms that only can come from normal systematic thinking, for "only where there is intelligibility is there cognition...but the whole of being does not by any means resolve into intelligibility..."

With these ruminations serving as retrospectives, *Saving Lilia's Cry* now turns to prospective formulations. From this point on care should be taken by the reader to avoid objective certitude from sliding into fundamental fallacies when particular finite objects take on whole-views (Perennial 61).

As Jaspers' process in GP proceeds his thinking moves from an episteme-logic taking a vectored course, which starting with individual psychic phenomena, then moves on through meaningful psychic connections, on to the causal connection of psychic life, etc., and culminates finally standing before human life as a whole.

This point in my memoir marks that embarkation in life as a whole about which retrospective/prospective thinking takes an inconspicuous back seat and only comes forward in some systematic sense in my last years of reflection. As regards whole human thinking, faith takes a primary place—even though psyche-subjective and real-objective phenomena seems to spiral inward and downward—there is the faith that transcends exponentially and provides buoyancy as the need arises, see PFR 193 "Ciphers of History". One's history as with world history confronts the bombardments of uncertainty with an attitude of faith or nihilism, i.e. philosophical wisdom or a metaphysic that diminishes what makes humankind special.

Chapter 19

Upon the return to the seminary I'm accompanied by an informed logic wherein lingers— because freely allowed—those experiences that can get absorbed by and/or sometimes refined by academic processes. Distractions can bury, i.e. suppress memories. I was not that bookish and didn't allow group tradition to overtake experience and reason. Restrained freedom predominated; our group's religious phenomena are not so complex as to keep the mind's attention focused on idols that tend to replace meaningful memories and their relevance. For a thorough critique of religious tradition see Jaspers' reply to Jeanne Hersch's Catholic religious perspective LLP 770-777, 834ff. See treatment of heredity and tradition (DNA, genotype and phenotype inheritance GP @508, and cultural inheritance 709).

Chapter 20, 21, and 22

The central idea in these Chapters has to do with a microcosm of total planning and the relatively free response to it. Moreover though, planning involves the making of connections, connections made by the planners and those affected by the plans. For a macrocosmic treatment of total planning see Jaspers 1965 *Origin and Goal of History* p 172ff regarding socialistic thinking. For more current and more thorough treatment of planning and the necessity for worldwide orderliness, see his *The Future of Mankind*, and for his latest thinking applied to total planning and the place of Philosophy and Revelation, see his *Philosophical Faith and Revelation*.

Regarding the matter of the forms of thinking in central planning and the dangers, the restrains it can have on the freedom of consciousness, review the planning-powers' harvesting or collecting of other powers in *Origin* especially the footnote about Hayek p 281ff. See also alcoholism in GP 480, 684, 688, 691 (other than the pages listed in the GP General Index). See phenotype and genotype p. 111 and centralized planning gone awry @115 under "The growth of private worlds from unattached feelings". A good example of a power collecting other powers would be the meetings sponsored by the "Vatican's" "Pontifical Academy of Sciences". It's a sample of how "a group of men, turns the call upon God into an instrument of worldly power" (PFR The political methods of the Church, 44).

The invasion of a high tech apparatus (pacemaker) can have cosmic or constellation effects within an individual body and the brain-mind—such as with my father. My hesitancy toward approving the pacemaker implantation was more complex and cosmic than "Sue's" simple (transparently cosmetic) "see Clarence...they want your estate". There were socio-psycho-moral considerations such as Pacemakers' troubles; e.g. wires leading to the heart can break due to metal fatigue. But also if the heart beats too slowly the brain cannot get enough blood and symptoms result, but also a slowing heart pressure could be a natural compensation for weakening arteries.

One aspect of the sudden return to proper blood supply is that if another person influenced decisions during insufficient blood supply, the return of normal blood supply can bring on psychic shock due to the sudden realization that irreparable mistakes in judgment had been made. When cognizance and responsible independent thinking returns and mental connections resume, it introduces a whole range of phenomena that border on the psychopathological in individual cases—see Jaspers' GP, Techniques and Experimentation.

Keeping an individual alive to preserve life unconditionally becomes a question of whether a person is kept alive for healthcare funds to support the demands of provider and healthcare forces such as union members as a voting bloc to be rewarded (and some healthcare providers have religious institutional investments where right-to-life and death issues affect the economics of the large corporate church investments)—always powers to be factored in to total planning issues.

In my father and mother's case my quiet judgment was that suffering for the latter was an economic issue for the medical industry more than a humane issue. In my father's individual case, it potentially turned an easy fading away event into

an agonizing episode: “the apparatus designed” to aid the patient “by its very working, made the existence of true physicians impossible” p. 67 *Man in Modern Age*. The possibility of Pa becoming his own true physician became a reality. Holistic remedy came home and he could decide to live...conditionally. He, unlike Ma, could face pain and death on his own conditional terms—if immediate circumstances allowed the plan to be quickly enacted. He also had control over patient-information for the good of the patient: he could keep quiet about the flaw that offered him an ultimate expression of will in the face of the ultimate situation of dying. See especially *Philosophy and the World*, Doctor/patient, p170ff, Gateway, 1963.

The apparatus was/is profitable for the enterprising individual and corporations that are given individual tax status advantages, but questions still prevail as Jaspers pointed out in “Physical treatments” GP @832. An apparatus can have shocking effects in the brain—and mind affects—that question the therapeutic value from a quality perspective. Minute electric currents emanating from the brain can serve as an index to “physiological events that are also closely related to psychic events” GP 231. The simplicity of relying on vital signs needs to be penetrated. One can be seduced and uncharacteristically subjected to confusing ideas unless what is transparent is penetrated and the technical apparatus seen from a deeper reality as possibly more of a problem than solution. A transparent plan (largely based on vital signs) may be less real than apparent, and as John Locke reminds, we should beware of clear and distinct ideas based on a common sense maxim (An Essay concerning Human Understanding). The transparently clear effect of the transplanted pacemaker was so clear that the more real effects went unnoticed or ignored by physicians and others like family.

In Chapter 22, regarding the pacemaker—Here the correctness of the connections made with ideas and ideas with reality is hardly verifiable to any high degree of certainty. In the space between ideas it is easy to take poetic flight (see PFR, p 347, Kierkegaard as poet, or prophet, or mere detective; also 123, the dangers poets present). The meaningfulness of the connections I was making regarding the pacemaker’s effects on Pa’s judgments are connections made in a grey area of the mind..

The connections I made were judgments about Pa’s behavior before and after the pacemaker, and included Pa’s stated conviction that he had control over the pacemaker by being able to switch it off by simply raising his arm. He was making connections between life-and-death ideas including ideas about impending pain. To have control over the apparatus involved an idyllic concept; he could raise his arm and still not be publicly judged guilty of self-murder and yet have access to a place of repose, e.g. a nirvana idea. He could say if pinned to pain, he could disconnect and be in what would be paradise compared to the suffering state.

My memoir’s temptation to take a novel flight of ideas was real, i.e. I could introduce new connections. For instance, I could take interpretative license and state that when Pa was found with his left arm raised it was as if to shutdown the apparatus. That bit of narration about the way he was found, though having no factual testimonial basis, could have dramatic poetic effects. Though possibly true

by design, reflex, or chance, it would be at best a case-history-informed guess for self rather than public educative purposes.

The thin line walked between meaningful and meaningless connections is precarious when what might be fiction is publicly espoused as certain fact. That walk becomes vicarious as it crosses spaces—voids more apparent than real—for it means picking or attracting stuff jumping off complex unities that have already been constructed by self and from others' constructions. See GP, Chapter XIII, "The Human Species" (eidology and eidologie).

Chapter 23

"One can also find very old people indeed who show hardly any psychic deterioration though the brain shows severe senile changes" GP 686, and this relative to arterio-sclerotic changes, or in this case relative also to circulation due to the pacemaker and the previous condition, i.e., the vital signs used to diagnose the seeming need for it. Moreover, "perhaps senile dementia is the only disease of age; it rests above all on heredity" GP687.

See also disturbances of memory, and note that concrete terms disappear first in some cases but abstract terms and conjunctions can be preserved longer. GP176 The active mind in one's latter years might expend less cognition on more recent experiences and more on those earlier experiences that were extrapolated because valued and which involved additional conjunctions (linguistic conjunctions involve psyche connections). What stands out in conscience, if one has some in degrees, is what memory extrapolates into a vivid abstraction. For the elderly—that are in principle more Protestant than Catholic—the recollections of first sins to the most recent takes place in the confessional of the mind and that realization is due in part to it not having been lost in the confessional booth.

In the latter years it becomes clearer that romanticism is logical positivism and materialistic rationalism (dialectical materialism), whereas "philosophical logic is the form of honesty grown conscious" *Reason and Existenz* 134. Rational logic "alone" breaks off the dialectical process too soon.

On the subtitle "lifting a hand for assisted suicide"—Karl Jaspers and his Jewish wife Gertrude kept poison ready in event the Nazi pain-corporation came to the door. This is my rendition: Not to be outdone by his older brother, Enno also kept powder handy though he had no Jewish connections other than through his brother's marriage. Enno could be categorized as a rationalist in comparison to his brother's apparent reasonableness. He sought death while the other sought life but both were not prepared to live unconditionally. Enno took the poison and his last recorded words were to Karl about the cost and controversy over Enno's living style: "...the ducats [gold coins] are saved" (See Kirkbright, *Jaspers...Navigations*, p 106. If one is going to write words like this, one might as well drop all life insurance policies, for what can be taken as a confession or philosophy about one person's nightmare becomes a dream for the Life insurance industry—but it puts a DNR (do not resuscitate) kink in the flow of healthcare funds used for life support machines.

In our current healthcare crises we can easily intuit that healthcare costs have reached the critical mess stage—a Kevorkian state of affairs. For as in Germany, it has here reached the point where the non-centralized choice-recourse is for everyone to have and hold the cup in Jones-town readiness, for pain resulting from getting wounded and left on the battle field in the fight for corporate voting bloc forces.

The fear of pain is being exploited by the healthcare-pharmaceutical-insurance industrial corporations, to which the Supreme Court has now given civil-rights protection that was constitutionally meant for the protection of real individuals. The nameless individuals now holding the ransom-priced keys to the narcotics cabinet are unapproachable. “They” having the keys to relief are hidden under the flow chart and behind the corporate front line of well-paid corporate executives now having less risk than ever of being successfully prosecuted.

Chapter 24 and “on love”

Explanatory theories are always dominated by the category of causality, but in Chapter 24 a predominant theory (love) about meaning gets support from an underlying or overview of how to express complex meanings in clear and distinct ways. The role of meaning and the role of causal deduction is systematically portrayed in GP 530ff *The Explanatory Theories—their Meaning and Value*. Here Jaspers makes distinctions between hypotheses and theories and attempts to clarify the feathering off of one into the other.

I’d like to think that the GP reference is not meant to add credibility to my theory, nor to the causalities or notions my mind worked with. But the Jaspers’ references do show how the dynamical workings can be systematized using critical forms of thinking—and then how criticism is tamed by love. The greater predominate critical attitude challenges the value of the connections made, and weights the worthwhileness of sharing the story.

It is at this point that my hypothetical process taxis for a take off toward changing the memoir into a novel. The less clear the causal connections become, that uncertainty gives lift to the hypothetical guesses, and purely non-fiction can morph into a fiction so apparently real it can be presumed to be real. The greater the uncertainty the more a theory is confined to a hypothesis, but the hypothetical can provide airlift to meaning through theory that reaches beyond being tested. Theory occupies both ends of the testing (hypothesis) spectrum, like life has an “I don’t remember where I came from” on one end and “I don’t know where I am going” on the other end, and except for the grace of God from there I came and go.

It’s precarious to occupy a fair medium or means for the sake of self-education and others’ learning. There’s risk in staking out the area where metaphysical poetic narratives pass for philosophy. Forewarning is forearming, but it can weaken the effect. Without fictionalizing there is some loss of general popular appeal.

Jaspers never resorts to story telling (except for short anecdotes, *Perennial* p 59) like some of his contemporaries, namely Gabriel Marcel. Those so-called

existential thinkers that opt for story telling don't have the clinical base for expounding their agenda. Without this clinical base the narrative becomes some outlet for religiously held agendas. Marcel was Catholic and when one belongs to a group, political or religious, book sales within the group are assured, and then the propagation about sales statistics snowballs off that causality, i.e. the popular surface of a group's power or the strength of its prevailing culture.

The importance of doing reviews of Jaspers' work here is seen in the effort to retrace mental steps to determine where quality thinking deviated by being attracted to mass appeal. There is a critical mass point to mass pop, and loose thinking leaps in. Though loose thinking might not be clinical, there is still a qualifying process of thinking that is to be gained through Jaspers' experiences and descriptions. It can reveal loose thinking.

It is in Chapter XI of GP that Jaspers critiques Freud. It is at this juncture in my memoirs—Chapter 24—that the predominance of faith turns to love more than understanding (in the sense of affection for humanity). In Jaspers "Excursions...Freud" 359; this is the only section I'm aware of in GP where he includes Freud's name in a subheading, and refers the reader also to another incidental reference on p 773ff where he states that "freudianisms has become a movement of faith within the guise of science" 774. In other words, to avoid positivism, to avoid the Freudian pitfall of believing everything can be traced back to something sexual, Jaspers avoids appealing to stimulating that urge through pop appeal (population being the urge to populate by copulation). That mistaken theory as a predominant theory is not needed for my memoir to continue. The theory must be avoided for my story's greater meaning.

p. 154—A mitochondrial (mtDNA) reference can be found in Jaspers' GP 667. There are always that which underlies phenomena, see 547 where he says that in natural scientific theories "something is construed as underlying the phenomena (atoms, electrons, waves, etc.). In this memoir, an effort emerges to prevent overbearing notions and causes from creeping in and smothering out transcending meaning. Something meaningless is not allowed to remove what makes the whole human world distinct. Both paternal and maternal inherited determinates that feed the human genome are not allowed to succumb to the overgrowth of a gender biased theory of origin (such as "evolutionism's" *mitochondrial Eve*). See also P and World, "modern physics" p 179.

Chapter 25

Romanticism and positivism (or rationalism) are specific forms of cognition with different names for attitudes that take on the color of a particular environment. If romanticism can be described as the bombardment of emotions within a confined frame of reference without a transcendent window for release and enlightenment to enter, then Jaspers' description of positivism applies. Philosophical thinking allows for seeing that when "our horizon is limited to empirical knowledge, current value judgments" become an uncritically accepted latent premise. *Perennial* 139ff.

Chapter 26 (and backward glance at Chapter 25)

Jaspers in 1946 had entirely revised some details in his 1913 *General Psychopathology*, though some revisions had occurred in previous years. He was therefore still thinking in psychopathic categories or classifications when three years later at the age of 66 he wrote *The Origin and Goal of History* in 1949—a thought process including timely reflections on the mad world he and his were caught up in (WWI and II).

In this work he includes a diagram that seems simple and lucid. It is not a “taxonomy” (the word comes from that Greek world of thought that proceeds from a known origin for humankind). Jaspers is very careful about the ciphers or symbols he uses. The “schema” is designed with the history of humankind in mind as the starting point for historical thinking (though he uses “mankind” in the generic sense, an editorial cipher for both genders).

The scheme begins and ends in what is neither known nor knowable. It is set in a rotating world and universe with steppes and archipelagos amidst moving continental plates (in an “examination of the revolving globe”). The “simple schema [is] (to be read from the bottom upwards).” That parenthetical instruction is important because the schematic diagram of humankind’s history presumes “The one origin of” humankind, and ends at the top with “the one world of mankind *on the earth*”[emphasize mine]. The origin-and-goal is primarily transcendental in an incoming sort of meaningfulness and revelation.

The fundamental concept involved is summed up in “as I think of the one [origin and goal] so I think of the other [goal and origin]” p 26. Loose ends in humankind’s history include primitive peoples’ earth-extinction and integration, and peripheral orbital populations’ integrating into the world. The illogic of origin-dualistic thinking is avoided in that Nietzsche comment that if man came from ape, man returns to ape, see Jaspers’ *Nietzsche...Introduction*, 268.

His schema includes the complexities involving infinite genotype plus phenotype variations, and intentionally avoids the pseudo objective DNA tracing to satisfy positivism’s need for absolute terms about origin, a positivism’s precarious surfboarding on the earth’s quaking geo shifting plates’ movements over infinite time and space. Regarding origins; long time or short time thinking reflects an eternal recurrence of origin and goal rather than a theory of racial origin that involves a racial bias and that is then reflected in illogicality. When the theory is given hypothetic status as “the” hypothesis, it constructs an elite phylum wherein hubris is a systemic problem and always latently immanent.

Jaspers avoids this consequence by reassuring the reader in the introduction by using ciphers that have historical-therapeutic meaningfulness, such as: “All men are related in Adam, originate from the hand of God and are created after His image” (Origin...xv). “An invented God cannot have such an effect” as the uplift of true belief in God, *Truth and Symbol* 77f. See also Jaspers’ *Philosophy and the World*, “The limits of Educational Planning” 22ff, and “The Creation of the World” 125ff.

Conclusion: Concepts known as “modernity”/“post-modernity” and a “post-individualistic” trend

Ambidextrous verbiage—There’s a need to show the significance of the justified tension between protestant (small p) thinking and “Catholic” thinking, and the fact of the tension’s existence in the struggle for power—amidst the forces—especially the empowerment that references to Jaspers’ work can present. To illustrate empowerment, note this revealing and ambiguous and *more-wrong-than-right* quote: “There can be little doubt that Jaspers’ harangue against the notion of ‘Catholicity’ is in large measure informed...” The use of the word “harangue” manifests the need for the author of this quote, Alan M. Olson, professor of religion education at the prestigious Boston University, to try to balance Jaspers’ criticism of Catholicism with Alan’s need to appease the Catholic scholars that have infiltrated a Karl-Jaspers-club. The quote is taken from Gregory Walters’ *Karl Jaspers and the Role of “Conversion” in the Nuclear Age*, p 224.

As with any specialty, informed specialty critics can pick out outstanding meanings that to the less specialized would seem like a stretch of the imagination to see anything more than insignificant and questionable nuances—if anything at all. Alan’s use of the highly charged word “harangue” is followed by conflicting rationally charged words indicating that Jaspers was justified in his “harangue”...but the “harangue” is due to dated causes such as the misbehavior of the “Vatican” during the Nazi period. The illogicality of Alan’s conflicting terms, concepts, is clear if penetrated:

The conflict is made clearer when the author, Gregory Walters, quoting Alan corrects Alan’s improper use of “Pius XII”. Gregory shows disapproval for Alan’s reference to “Pius XII” by bracketing [sic] (Gregory writes the “sic” after Alan’s “Pius XII[sic]”). My quotation marks indicate disapproval for allowing a vatic authority a gratuitous handicap, a begging for authority.

The “[sic]” is also ambiguous to the non-Catholic. It leaps on a reasonable tolerance for mistakes where uncertainty holds out over infallibility. Alan’s wording offers Gregory Walters some occasion to use, if not exploit, the ambiguity of the papal reference: One can wonder whether Gregory is saying Alan’s mistake is the wrong “pope” or that Alan’s mistake showed a lack of respect by not omitting the “proper” degree of reverence, i.e. “Pope”.

Gregory, though possibly not a practicing Catholic, as a tolerated friend and surf in the Catholic industry, he would not make a specific papal reference without showing proper reverence. The problem would have been avoided if Alan had not used XII or XI but used the name, e.g. Mr. Ratti, or if space and time were plentiful, Ambrogio Damiano Achille Ratti, or Eugenio Maria Giuseppe Giovanni Pacelli whichever truly applied.

The nominal degree in pronunciation becomes an excuse for a shorter and presumptuous appellation for holiness, i.e. “Pope” (a south-of-the-Alps appellation). Here again the ambiguity slips immediately into illogicality having historic proportions: The first “pius”-“XI” was on watch during 1933, and the responsibility for the concordat progress overlapped the “papacy” so that both XI

and XII shared in the risk but in reality it was an escape into a cloud of ambiguity systemic to the holy orders. The “Vatican” vatic system’s complexity allowed for the distribution of blame spread out beyond lucid recognition. But both vatic representatives (though protected by corporate power) were involved in the Reichskonkordat with Germany, the latter “pius” XII in concluding the treaty—though the damage had already been done. (See Jaspers Question of German Guilt, @ 93.)

The above absorption of transparency, the dissipation being a systemic problem, is designed to be both clear and not so clearly complex but all the more convoluted. Religious orders and the systemic complexity is a good example of how titles of distinction and individual responsibility are by subtle design lost in a corporation including the corporate church—religious or secular. What appears and sounds like transparency can be the subtle transfer of simplicity to a complex system of religious orders that beg for being accepted as irreproachable, i.e. transparent—until penetrated by a quest for truth that...begs not.

In my way of thinking transparency needs penetrating especially when there’s a begging of the question by way of titles of distinction or by cleric or secular uniforms or authoritative religious verbiage. (See Jaspers’ Three Essays, 1964, Harcourt, Brace & World, Max Weber, 215—for a form of thinking regarding uniforms.)

Kierkegaard and Nietzsche shows Jaspers does not harangue—Further indications for drawing attention to the religious powers’ involvement in my memoir can be found in Jaspers’ view of the importance of the insights of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Both were born into protestant influence, and both followed through with penetrating the prevailing rationalism; they fulfilled positivism each in his individualistic way.

They are the popular fourth estate (published) personages that penetrated modernity. One penetrated and coined the leap of faith concept (and then that coin was leaped on by Catholic forces and interpreted to mean a leaping fall face down in prostration before vatic authority) while Nietzsche’s rationality imploded, thus bringing enough religious and rational uncertainty to fore allowing for the application of the word post-modernity. So there is much more to Jaspers’ insight than what is suggested in Alan’s use of the word “harangue”.

We don’t have to quote Jaspers to see that the word “harangue” is more of an emotional description than objective observation. In *A Kierkegaard Anthology* edited by Robert Bretall, @282 the view is expressed that though it can be argued that Kierkegaard was fundamentally and irrevocably Protestant...” some of his statements “naturally [have] been seized upon by Catholics as proving that S.K. might have found his way into the true Church, had he lived a few years longer”. I would like to emphasize the word “naturally” to point at the general ease with which “seizing” control or harvesting powers into the collective, is hidden behind “solidarity” gibberish.

Where Jaspers is concerned, Kierkegaard is so important in religious history that he asks if the protestant ministry is possible after Kierkegaard. With Kierkegaard in mind he answers extensively in the affirmative and states it is

more likely to occur on protestant soil—if the protestant movement can avoid imitating Catholicity by thinking and talking about catholicity (PFR).

Nietzsche was born a protestant. He was a minister's son; both sides of his family had lines of ministers. He was a philologist and professor at University of Basel. In his most sane years he was clearly anti Holy Roman Catholic to the Lutheran core. No Catholic wanted to lay claim to Nietzsche. His honesty made him far less Catholic than Protestant, but if Protestant then he had to be propagated to have been an atheist, and it had to also be propagated that his illness was due to protesting-thinking in opposition to Catholicism—one reason Jaspers made sure it was understood that the late Nietzsche had an organic brain disorder.

But Nietzsche was someone exhibiting language that could be displayed as the consequences of protestant thinking. The Catholic progressives needed someone to harvest the popularity of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. It had to be harvested indirectly and of course ambiguously. This personage took the form of Heidegger. Jaspers could not be made a Catholic for sure, but all that Jaspers was, would be, or could be, had to be in some manner a product of Catholicism; it had to be rumored that Jaspers rubbed something off Heidegger, the latter as one influenced by Kierkegaardian faith and Nietzschean academia. Thus the need for Jaspers to timely publish his analyses of Kierkegaard and especially Nietzsche before the powers could reap and misinterpret them.

Jaspers would not let this happen and that seems partly why he wrote *Nietzsche and Christianity*, which was a prologue to *Nietzsche, An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*.

It was in the latter part of the fifties when it occurred to me in a flash and then empirically verified, that is, informed and inferred by the timing of Jaspers' publications which seemed to always beat Heidegger's proposals to the press. But Jaspers' timely productions are not ranting or haranguing; for it is a philosophical war on the field of metaphysical exploitation. Jaspers was as much of a tactician fit for the fourth-estate task, as he was an experienced and sharpened psychopathologist.

Of course Jaspers could not be so obvious for he too would be harvested or conveniently re-read as an atheist by the academia side of Catholic institutionalism. I would not, and in truth could not, read him as an atheist just because he was Catholic Christianity's subtle nemesis. What he was doing would become apparent to me for I had nothing to lose in seeing it from a penetrated perspective. I saw the spiritual struggle of the religious forces.

The forces could have been modified by other adjectives. It could have been Hebrew force vs. Greek, creation v. origin, faith v. positivistic materialistic rationalism, reason vs. modernity/post-modernity, etc. But this much is clear: Jaspers encompasses in every provincial and cosmopolitan (cosmos-politan) sense, penetrates, and transcends all that can be meant by modernity and postmodernity especially when the "ity" is morphed into an "ism". With regard to Jaspers, to speak of the *Existenz* philosophy in one or the other or both categories simultaneously (i.e. modernity and postmodernity), is to beg for a position where Jasper is not running.

The language of “modernity” and “postmodernity” is oppressive to open communication. Journalism, the *fourth estate* and its vectoring power, determines pop meaning, i.e. definition, and Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were journalists. If journalistic productivity determines how categories for handling history should be used then Jaspers’ production quantitatively and qualitatively exceed Heidegger’s products.

A fourth-estate example: Wikipedia’s *Postmodernism* in the section called “philosophical movements and contributors” lists the first influencer (postmodernist) as Karl Barth and as though in reaction to a Protestant voice, Heidegger is listed as the second influencer, *possibly to capitalize on the fact that “Pius XII” dubbed Barth as a Catholic friend equal to “Sainthood” by referring to him as the most important theologian since Saint Thomas Aquinas*. All estates take a lower power status compared to journalism’s propaganda effects—thus the value of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Jaspers (see Jaspers’ shattering of Barth in PFR, p325ff which tends to verify my point).

Post Individualism History—A Roman Catholic theologian has introduced an old protestant concept with a colorful anti-protestant banner flashing, “entering the post-individualistic phase of history”. The old concept of the kingdom of God being within the individual is confronted by an old sectarian gang-like force that oppresses individual achievement unless one curtsies—if not prostrates—before Holy Orders. (See Karl Rahner, “The Experiment Man” [a Darwinian bit of wording] (see Walters, p. 272).

The relevance to “Saving Lilia’s Cry”—I saw the tension between Jaspers and Heidegger, with Jaspers by far having the greater intellectual and experiential pulling power—e.g. as I became cognizant of it @1968 in *Karl Jaspers’ Existenz Philosophy and the Possible Application to Counseling*, pp @ 145. This alertness to the power struggle (Jaspers/Heidegger, protestant/Catholic, origin uncertainty v. origin certitude) and the later experience of having it born out may have led me to have too much confidence in my intuitive, inductive, and deductive ability regarding “Saving Lilia’s Cry”.

Moreover though, I prefer that her cry was/is both transparent and penetrating to consciousness and should involve coming to terms with its affectation, i.e., its affect on the development of conscience. If the clear cry were penetrated by reason more than rationalism, the former should produce meaningfulness, whereas the latter course takes the form of the cry being simply a materialistic meaningless response to stimuli. I have an informed suspicion that the latter carries the germ of destruction to what makes humankind humane.